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TESTIMONIAL DEFICIENCIES AND 
EVIDENTIARY UNCERTAINTIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS 
Nancy Amoury Combs * 
In this article, the author describes the flaws inherent in the process 
of international criminal tribunals which seek to punish the inhu-
mane actions of dictators. The author first describes how interna-
tional criminal trials confront severe impediments to accurate fact-
finding. It continues on to discuss the failure of witnesses in these 
tribunals to accurately convey the information needed to make a ful-
ly-informed decision. This problem is compounded by the fact that 
what clear information is provided during witness testimony often is 
inconsistent with the information that the witness previously pro-
vided in a pre-trial statement. The author also explores the causes 
behind the lack of accuracy in witness testimony, which include the 
lack of education or life experiences and the lack of familiarity with 
trial procedures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After decades of inactivity, international criminal law has lately 
emerged as one of the most rapidly developing and influential subjects of in-
ternational law and global politics. Sixty years after Nazi offenders were 
prosecuted at Nuremberg, the international community established an inter-
national criminal tribunal to prosecute those responsible for international 
crimes in the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The ICTY spawned a number of 
progeny, including the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Special Panels in the Dili 
District Court in East Timor (Special Panels), the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia, and, most importantly, a permanent International 
Criminal Court (ICC). The establishment of these institutions constitutes, in 
Mark Drumbl's words, "one of the more extensive waves of institution-
building in modem international relations." 1 
Most international law scholars warmly greeted the establishment of 
these tribunals. 2 Although large-scale atrocities have been committed since 
the dawn of humanity, for most of human history these atrocities have not 
elicited criminal sanctions. So, the move to impose accountability on brutal 
dictators who were responsible for widespread death, suffering and destruc-
tion was considered a tremendous advance, and early commentators credited 
international criminal prosecutions with advancing a host of praise-worthy 
purposes. International criminal prosecutions were said to affirm the rule of 
law in previously lawless societies, 3 to promote peace-building and transi-
1 MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW I 0 (2007). 
2 Richard Goldstone called the new international tribunals "a tremendous and exciting step 
forward," Richard Goldstone, Conference Luncheon Address, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. I, 2 ( 1997), while Payam Akhavan hailed them as "an unprecedented institutional ex-
pression of the indivisibility of peace and respect for human rights" that represented "a radical 
departure from the traditional realpolitik paradigm which has so often and for so long ignored 
the victims of mass murder and legitimized the rule of tyrants in the name of promoting the 
purported summum bonum of stability," Payam Akhavan, Justice and Reconciliation in the 
Great Lakes Region of Africa: The Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 325, 327 ( 1997) (italics added). At least that was the 
view of conunentators with an internationalist perspective. Scholars of a realist bent have 
questioned the wisdom and viability of international trials. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Ste-
phen Krasner, The Limits of Idealism, DIEDALUS, 47-53, Winter 2003, available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20027822; Anthony D' Amato, Peace vs. Accountability in Bosnia, 
88 AM. J. INT'L L. 500, 500-02 (1994). For a brief discussion of the realist critique of interna-
tional criminal law, see DRUMBL, supra note I, at I 0. 
3 See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER 
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 25 ( 1998); RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 56 (2000) 
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tion to democracy in war-torn lands, 4 to assist in reconciling former ene-
mies, 5 to deter future megalomaniacs from committing similar crimes, 6 to 
create a historical record of the conflict, 7 and to diminish the victims' pro-
pensity to blame collectively all those in the offenders' group. 8 International 
criminal justice was, in sum, the subject of a great deal of soaring and inspi-
rational rhetoric. 
In recent years, the glow surrounding international criminal justice has 
begun to fade. The scandalous cost of international criminal trials has driven 
some critiques, while inadequate outreach efforts have formed the basis for 
others. 9 On a much broader scale, Larry May, in his trilogy on crimes 
(arguing that "criminal justice plays a role ... in defining legitimate institutions of judgment. 
Individuating wrongdoing lifts collective responsibility from the prior regime and relegiti-
mates state authority."); Stephan Landsman, Alternative Responses to Serious Human Rights 
Abuses: Of Prosecution and Truth Commissions, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 83 ( 1996); 
The Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies,~ 39, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 
2004). 
4 Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of 
Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 9 EuR. J. INT'L L. 2, 9-10 (1998) [hereinafter 
Cassese, On the Current Trends]. 
5 For a discussion of this literature, see HARVEY M. WEINSTEIN & ERIC STOVER, Introduction: 
Conflict, Justice and Reclamation, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY 
IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY I, 3-4 (2004 ). 
6 Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of 
a Prior Regime, I 00 YALE L.J. 2537, 2542 (1991 ); Alejandro M. Garro & Henry Dahl, Legal 
Accountability for Human Rights Violations in Argentina: One Step Forward and Two Steps 
Backward, 8 HUM. RTS. L.J. 283,343 (1987); Jaime Malamud-Goti, Transitional Governments 
in the Breach: Why Punish State Criminals?, 12 HUM. RTs. Q. I, 12 (1990); M. Cherif Bas-
siouni, Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing Accountability over Realpolitik, 35 
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 191, 192 (2003). Indeed, the Security Council established the ICTY 
while the Yugoslavian conflict was still underway with the express goal of deterring interna-
tional crimes. See Provisional Agenda of the Forty-Ninth Regular Session ofthe General As-
sembly,~ 13, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/49/1 50 (July. 22, 1994). 
7 Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Evidence Before the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON ICTY 
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 249, 252-53 (Richard 
May et a!. eds., 200 I); Cassese, On the Current Trends. supra note 4, at 9-1 0; Antonio Cas-
sese, Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. I, 6-9 ( 1998). 
8 Cassese, On the Current Trends, supra note 4, at 9; see also MINOW, supra note 3, at 40; 
Richard J. Goldstone, 50 Years after Nuremberg: A New International Criminal Tribuna/for 
Human Rights Criminals, in CONTEMPORARY GENOCIDES: CAUSES, CASES, CONSEQUENCES 
215, 215-16 (Albert J. Jongman ed., I996). 
9 See, e.g., Geoffrey Nice & Philippe Vallieres-Roland, Procedural Innovations in War Crime 
Trials, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JusT. 354, 355 (2005); Samantha Power, Rwanda: The Two Faces of 
Justice, 50 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Jan. 16, 2003; Ivan Simonovic, Dealing with the Legacy of 
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against humanity, war crimes and aggression, 10 has carefully scrutinized and 
explicated the nonnative foundations of international criminal law, rejecting 
much that does not conform to his moral minimalist account. Other scholars 
have begun questioning the ability of international criminal tribunals to 
achieve many of the goals that previously had been reflexively attributed to 
them. Thus, whereas early commentators unquestioningly assumed that in-
ternational criminal prosecutions would serve to deter the next generation of 
genocidal maniacs, more recently scholars have questioned that assump-
tion. 11 Recent empirical research also has called into question the ability of 
international criminal tribunals to advance reconciliation and peace-building 
efforts following large-scale violence. 12 And Mark Drumbl, for his part, has 
offered a comprehensive and sophisticated critique of international criminal 
justice, concluding that there exists a palpable disconnect between the effects 
of sentencing and the penological theories that are expected to justify the 
imposition of criminal punishment. 13 
These are impressive studies because they scrutinize many of the foun-
dational beliefs that drove the establishment of the international criminal tri-
bunals. However, as impressive as they are, they assume the question that 
forms the basis for my work. The scholars I have mentioned might question 
whether the prosecution of certain international crimes can be justified given 
their infringement on state sovereignty, 14 or they might conclude that inter-
national criminal trials impair the prospects for reconciliation rather than ad-
vance them, 15 but their critiques presuppose that international trials-even if 
Past War Crimes and Human Rights Abuses: Experiences and Trends, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 
701, 706-07 (2004); Christopher M. Gosnell, A Court Too Far, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 28, 
2008. 
10 LARRY MAY, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2005); LARRY MAY, WAR CRIMES AND JUST WAR (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) (herei-
nafter MAY, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY] ; LARRY MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST 
PEACE (Cambridge Univ. Press 2008) (hereinafter MAY, AGGRESSION] . 
11 See, e.g., Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacer-
bate Humanitarian Atrocities, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 777 (2006); Martti Koskenniemi, Between 
Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. I, 8- I I (2002). 
12 ERIC STOVER, THE WITNESSES: WAR CRIMES AND THE PROMISE OF JUSTICE IN THE HAGUE 
(2005); Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking 
the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation. 24 HuM. RTS. Q. 573 (2002); Marie-Bem!dicte 
Dembour & Emily Haslam, Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War Crimes Trials, 15 
EUR. J. INT'L L. 151 (2004). 
13 DRUMBL, supra note I, at 149-80. 
14 See, e.g., MAY, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 10, at 83 (contending that "interna-
tional prosecutions require a showing that harm that is group-based has occurred"). 
15 See e.g., STOVER, supra note 12, at 15. 
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they can do nothing else--can determine with some measure of certainty 
whether or not a defendant engaged in the acts alleged in the indictment. 16 
That is, even if international trials have uncertain philosophical foundations, 
even if they regularly fail to deter, rehabilitate or reconcile, international 
criminal trials have at least been considered useful mechanisms for deter-
mining who did what to whom during a mass atrocity. 
It is that assumption that I will challenge. This article summarizes the 
research and conclusions that appear in my forthcoming book Factfinding 
Without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations for International 
Criminal Convictions (forthcoming 2010, Cambridge University Press). My 
research reveals that international criminal trials confront severe impedi-
ments to accurate fact-finding, impediments that should give rise to serious 
doubt about the accuracy ofthe Trial Chambers' factual determinations. The 
basis for my study is a large-scale review of transcripts from the ICTR, the 
SCSL and the Special Panels. From this review, I conclude that much eye-
witness testimony at the international tribunals is of highly questionable re-
liability. In particular, many international witnesses are unable to convey the 
information that court personnel expect-and need-to receive, if they are to 
have confidence in the factual determinations they make. Sometimes, wit-
nesses claim not to know the sought-after information, while in other in-
stances, the communication breaks down as a result of the questioning 
process. Moreover, what clear information is provided during witness testi-
mony often is inconsistent with the information that the witness previously 
provided in a pre-trial statement. Section I will summarize my findings re-
garding these testimonial deficiencies, findings that appear in Chapters Two 
and Four of my book. Section II will summarize Chapter Three of the book 
by canvassing some of the causes of the deficiencies. Section II reports, for 
instance, that many witnesses lack the education and life experiences to be 
able to read maps, tell time, or answer questions concerning distances and 
dates. Cultural norms and taboos create additional communication difficul-
ties, as some witnesses are reluctant to speak directly or at all about certain 
events and as international judges may inappropriately assess witnesses' de-
meanor and willingness to answer questions by Western norms. The need 
for language interpretation for virtually every fact witness-sometimes 
16 When Larry May, for instance, proposed a series of reforms designed to reduce the appear-
ance of political influence over international trials, he acknowledged that accepting his pro-
posals would make "the pursuit of the truth of the causes of the larger atrocity harder to ascer-
tain by means of trials." He consoled readers, however, that "[t]here will be truths 
nonetheless that will emerge ... namely that truth concerning whether a given defendant did 
participate in an atrocity and to what extent." MAY, AGGRESSION, supra note 10, at 337. 
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through multiple interpreters-and the unfamiliarity of most witnesses with 
the predominantly adversarial trial procedures in use at the international tri-
bunals only compound these problems. 
My review does not encompass ICTY proceedings because the ICTY is 
an outlier amongst the Tribunals that have prosecuted international crimes 
and that will be doing so in the future. Although a cursory review of ICTY 
transcripts reveals that those proceedings do feature some of the problems 
that will be described in the following pages, because the ICTY prosecutes 
crimes that took place in Europe, the educational, cultural and linguistic di-
vergences between witnesses and courtroom staff that so impair communica-
tion at the ICTR, the SCSL and the Special Panels do not prove as distortive. 
That in itself, would not be reason to exclude the ICTY from my study, but 
the fact that the ICC is currently focused exclusively on African conflicts 
suggests that the fact-finding impediments that I have identified in ICTR, 
SCSL and Special Panels' proceedings constitute a continuing concern for 
international criminal justice despite the fact that the ICTY does not feature 
them in the same number or severity. 
As a consequence of the fact-finding impediments that I will describe, 
the testimony of international witnesses often is vague, unclear and Jacking 
in the information necessary for fact-finders to make reasoned factual as-
sessments. As I noted, these deficiencies can be explained by the education-
al, cultural and linguistic factors referred to in Section II but they also can be 
explained by witness mendacity. Indeed, many of the testimonial difficulties 
canvassed in Section I-from the failure to answer questions of date, time 
and distance to the circuitous responses that so lengthen and complicate 
communication--could also stem from a witness's desire to evade. Al-
though every criminal justice system in the world has its share of lying wit-
nesses, Section II reports that ICTR and the SCSL have more than their 
share. The group-based loyalty and ethnic divisions that gave rise to the in-
ternational crimes in the first place can create powerful incentives to put 
enemies in prison, whether they belong there or not, and the international 
tribunals provide additional incentives-perhaps unwittingly-through the 
financial assistance that they provide to testifying witnesses. Whatever the 
causes of the false testimony, Section II reveals that some international crim-
inal tribunals hear a lot of it. Indeed, my review of ICTR cases shows that 
more than 90 percent of them featured an alibi or another example of diame-
trically opposing testimony from defense and prosecution witnesses. Al-
though some of these witnesses may be honestly mistaken, the use of alibis 
and the incidence of contradictory testimony so vastly exceeds that which is 
common to domestic trials that it would seem na'ive to dismiss a substantial 
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portion of it as arising from honest mistakes. 
Section III will summarize the final five Chapters of my book by ex-
ploring the conceptual and normative implications of the aforementioned tes-
timonial deficiencies. 
I. TESTIMONIAL DEFICIENCIES 
International criminal trials employ Western-style criminal procedures 
that presuppose a smooth flow of questions and answers between counsel 
and witnesses. In particular, it is expected that in response to counsel's 
questioning, eyewitnesses will convey the details of the events they wit-
nessed in a form that the fact-finder can both understand and critically eva-
luate. To be sure, clear communication between witnesses and fact-finders 
is not always realized even in domestic cases. Trials involving medical mal-
practice, products liability and patent claims - to provide only a few exam-
ples - frequently feature testimony about scientific or technological issues 
that are difficult for witnesses to clearly explain and for fact-finders to satis-
factorily grasp. But the ordinary domestic criminal trial rarely presents these 
problems. Eyewitnesses have a story to tell about certain events relevant to 
the defendant's criminal culpability and, through questioning, they are able 
to tell that story in a way that is not only comprehensible to the fact-finder 
but provides the fact-finder sufficient information to draw reasonable con-
clusions about the defendant's liability. Witnesses in domestic criminal tri-
als may not answer questions accurately, but they do answer the questions 
and they do answer them intelligibly. 
The same is frequently not the case at the ICTR, SCSL and Special 
Panels. Indeed, the smooth flow of questions and answers that is the norm in 
the domestic criminal trial often is unattainable at those tribunals. As my 
book describes in considerably greater detail, international witnesses fre-
quently are unable or unwilling to relate whole categories of information that 
are crucial to accurate fact-finding. Sometimes, witnesses claim not to know 
the sought-after information, while at other times, the difficulties seem to 
stem from the mode of courtroom questioning. Some witnesses claim not to 
understand counsel's questions, for instance, while others respond evasively 
or otherwise unresponsively, and still others testify in a manner that is al-
most entirely unintelligible to courtroom personnel. Make no mistake: 
many of these difficulties stem from factors beyond the witnesses' control. 
Indeed, as I just noted, Section II will consider various educational, cultural 
and linguistic explanations for the testimonial deficiencies. But whatever 
their causes, these difficulties create tremendous uncertainty about even the 
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most basic aspects of the criminal activities at issue in international trials. 
To begin, international witnesses often have difficulty answering basic 
questions that are asked of them. So, for instance, with some notable excep-
tions, international witnesses have trouble providing the dates of the events 
that they witnessed. 17 Sometimes a witness will be able to say that the event 
in question occurred during the dry season or the rainy season, 18 or better 
17 Prosecutor v. Hinga Norman et al., Case No. SCSL-2004-14-T, Transcript, June 16, 2004, 
5, 26; id., Transcript, at 34 (June 18, 2004); id., Transcript, at 29 (June 21, 2004); id., Tran-
script, at 119 (Sept. 9, 2004); id., Transcript, at 58 (Sept. 20, 2004); id., Transcript, at 17, 37, 
39, 74-75, 79-80 (Sept. 21, 2004); id., Transcript, at 20-21 (Sept. 23, 2004); id., Transcript, at 
25-27 (Sept. 29, 2004); id., Transcript, at 33, 88, 131; id., Transcript, at 111-12 (Nov. 8, 
2004 ); id., Transcript, at 39 (Nov. 9, 2004 ); id., Transcript, at 26 (Nov. 12, 2004 ); id., Tran-
script, at 95 (Nov. 16, 2004); id., Case No. SCSL-2004-14-T, Transcript, at 7-8 (Feb. 9, 
2005); id., Transcript, at 37-38 (Mar. I 0, 2004); id., Transcript, at 46 (Mar. 14, 2004); id., 
Transcript, at 20, 60 (June I, 2006); Prosecutor v. Brima et a!., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, 
Transcript, at 16 (Apr. 6, 2005); id., Transcript, at 61 (Apr. 7, 2005); id., Transcript, at 115-16 
(June 24, 2005); id. , Transcript, at 41, 95-96 (June 27, 2005); id., Transcript, at 9 (June 28, 
2005); id., Transcript, at 6, 24 (June 29, 2005); id., Transcript, at 96 (June 30, 2005); id., 
Transcript, at 46 (July 7, 2005); id., Transcript, at 18-19; 34-35 (July 8, 2005); Prosecutor v. 
Sesay et al., SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 47,74 (July 19, 2004); id., Transcript, at 24 (Apr. 
15, 2004); id., Transcript, at 44 (Dec. 8, 2005); Prosecutor v. Ghankay Taylor, Case No. 
SCSL 2003-01-T, Transcript, at 6440-41 (Apr. 2, 2008); id., Transcript, at 6686 (Apr. 4, 
2008); id., Transcript, at 7307-08 (Apr. II, 2008); id., Transcript, at 8548-49 (Apr. 24, 2008); 
id., Transcript, at 10277 (May 20, 2008); id., Transcript, at 10592, 10615 (May 22, 2008); id., 
Transcript, at 14235-36, 14303 (Aug. 21, 2008); id., Transcript, at 15603-04 (Sept. 5, 2008); 
id., Transcript, at 15889 (Set. I 0, 2008); id., Transcript, at 16028 (Sept. II, 2008); id., Tran-
script, at 16374-75, 16355-57 (Sept. 16, 2008); id., Transcript, at 16431-32 (Sept. 17, 2008); 
Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Los Palos Case Notes, at 26 (July 16, 200 I) [herei-
nafter Los Palos Case Notes] (on file with author); Judicial System Monitoring Programme, 
Lolotoe Case Notes, at 2 (May 9, 2002) [hereinafter Lolotoe Case Notes] (on file with au-
thor); id. at I (Oct. 23, 2002); id. at 18-20 (Mar. 17, 2003); Prosecutor v. Karera, Case No. 
ICTR-0 1-74-T, Transcript, at 27 (Jan. 9, 2006); Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-
44A-T, Transcript, at 83 (July 18, 200 I) (on file with author); Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, 
Case No. ICTR-96-17-T, Transcript, at 62-63 (Sept. 28, 2001) (on file with author); Prosecu-
tor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-0 1-71-T, Transcript, at 41 (Sept. 3, 2003); id., Transcript, 
at 2 (Sept. 8, 2003); id., Transcript, at 28 (Sept. 15, 2003); id., Transcript, at 47 (Sept. 16, 
2003); id., Transcript, at 42 (Sept. 29, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-
54A-T, Transcript, at 115 (Jan. 28, 2002) (on file with author); id., Transcript, at II (Feb. 5, 
2002) (on file with author). 
18 Sesay eta/., SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 2-3, II (July 21, 2004); id., Transcript, at 8, 21-
22 (Oct. 21, 2004); id., Transcript, at 94-97 (Jan. 13, 2004); id., Transcript, at 79 (Mar. 17, 
2006); Hinga Norman eta/., Case No. SCSL-2004-14-T, Transcript, at 54 (June 21, 2004); 
id., Transcript, at 160 (Sept. 14, 2004); id., Transcript, at 17, 24, 44 (Nov. 8, 2004); id., Tran-
script, at 4 (Nov. 12, 2004); id., Transcript, at 115-19 (Nov. 16, 2004); Brima eta/., Case No. 
SCSL-2004-16-PT, Transcript, at 20 (Apr. 8, 2005); id., Transcript, at 82-83, 97-99 (June 30, 
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yet, during a particular month; 19 but that is often about as precise as the dat-
ing gets, and many witnesses cannot provide even that much information. 20 
Failing to specify when particular events occurred substantially impairs the 
Tribunal's ability to find facts. The failure to date events can conceal incon-
sistencies between witness accounts that would otherwise come to light. 
More importantly, it prevents the defendant from presenting an alibi in de-
fense. We all recognize that it is a more compelling defense to assert: "I did 
not make a speech calling for the extermination of the Tutsi at a rally in 
Cyangugu on February 12, 1994, and I can prove it because I was attending 
a meeting of government ministers in Kigali on that day," than it is to say, "I 
did not make a speech calling for the extermination of the Tutsi at a rally in 
Cyangugu." But the fact that the defendant was at a meeting in Kigali on 
February 12, 1994 means nothing if the witness can say only that the rally 
occurred sometime during the rainy season. 
International witnesses also frequently have difficulty estimating dis-
tances. Some witnesses assert that they do not know the lengths of Western 
units of measurement, such as miles or kilometers. 21 Sometimes witnesses 
try to estimate when they are not really able. Asked how wide a road was, 
one Timorese witness responded "maybe 100 meters wide." He went on to 
2005); id., Transcript, at 102, 112-13 (July 7, 2005); Taylor, Case No. SCSL 2003-01-T, 
Transcript, at 6966 (Apr. 8, 2008); id., Transcript, at 7017, 7052 (Apr. 9, 2008); id., Tran-
script, at 7388 (Apr. 14, 2008). 
19 Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-01-71-T, Transcript, at 36 (Sept. 3, 2003); Ntakirutimana, 
Case No. ICTR-96-17-T, Transcript, at 8, 29 (Sept. 24, 2001); id., Transcript, at 43-46, 58 
(Sept. 26, 200 I); Brima eta!., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Transcript, at 61 (Apr. 6, 2005); 
id., Transcript, at 86 (Apr. II, 2005); id., Transcript, at 96 (June 27, 2005); id., Transcript, at 
100 (June 30, 2005); id., Transcript, at 8 (July I, 2005); id., Transcript, at 44 (July 7, 2005); 
id., Transcript, at 56, 74-75 (July II, 2005); id., Transcript, at 25 (July 12, 2005); Sesay eta!., 
SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 80-81 (Oct. 4, 2004); id., Transcript, at 182 (Oct. 8, 2004); id., 
Transcript, at 50, 57, 78 (Oct. 14, 2004); id., Transcript, at 31, 92 (Oct. 18, 2004); id., Tran-
script, at 96 (Oct. 25, 2004); id., Transcript, at 13-14 (Oct. 27, 2004). 
20 Brima eta!., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Transcript, at 30 (July 25, 2005); id., Transcript, 
at 73-74 (Apr. 7, 2005); Hinga Norman et al., Case No. SCSL-2004-14-T, Transcript, at 20 
(Nov. II, 2004). 
21 Brima eta/., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Transcript, at 31 (Mar. 8, 2005); Karera, Case 
No. ICTR-01-74-T, Judgment and Sentence,~ 296 (Dec 7, 2007) (Witness maintains that he 
does not understand the metric system and can estimate only by "paces."); Los Palos Case 
Notes, supra note 17, at 84 (July 27, 200 I) ("I don't know what I 00 meters is, I only found 
out when a journalist told me."); id. at 94 (July 30, 2001) ("I really don't know about me-
ters."); see also Taylor, Case No. SCSL 2003-01-T, Transcript, at 7620 (Apr. 15, 2008); id., 
Transcript, at 7738-39 (Apr. 16, 2008) (witness unable to estimate by means of football 
fields). 
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testify that it was wide enough for one car to fit. 22 And a Sierra Leonean 
witness insisted that he walked 12 miles in 45 minutes even after it was 
pointed out to him that it would be hard to drive the distance in that amount 
of time, let alone to walk it. 23 Accurate answers to distance questions are of 
key importance to fact-finders. How much weight a Trial Chamber can jus-
tifiably place on a witness's identification of a defendant at a particular 
scene will depend in large part on how far the witness was from the defen-
dant. A Trial Chamber that hears only that "the distance was not great" is 
making factual findings in the dark. 
Duration estimates24 and numerical estimates25 also frequently prove 
22 Los Palos Case Notes, supra note 17 (July 31 , 2001 ). 
23 Brima eta/., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Transcript, at 29 (July 5, 2005). 
24 See. e.g., Lolotoe Case Notes, supra note 17, at 4 (Apr. 9, 2002); Hinga Norman eta/., 
Case No. SCSL-2004-14-T, Transcript, at 20-21 (Sept. 23, 2004); Brima et a/., Case No. 
SCSL-2004-16-PT, Transcript, at 58-59 (Mar. 8, 2005); id., Transcript, at 112 (Apr. 7, 2005); 
Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al., Case No. JCTR-98-42-T, Transcript, at 15 (Mar. 19, 
2003); Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-01-71-T, Transcript, at 8-9 (Sept. 16, 2003); Kamuhan-
da, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-T, Transcript, at 61,64 (Feb. 12, 2002) (on file with author); Tay-
lor, Case No. SCSL 2003-01-T, Transcript, at 6684-86 (Apr. 4, 2008); id. , Transcript, at 
14869 (Aug. 28, 2008); Sesay eta/., SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 77 (July 19, 2004); id., 
Transcript, at 6 (July 15, 2004); id., Transcript, at 2-3 (July 21, 2004); id., Transcript, at 52, 
57 (July 27, 2004); id. Transcript, at 80, 84 (Oct. 21 , 2004); id. , Transcript, at 39-40 (Apr. 12. 
2005); id. Transcript, at 32 (Nov. 4, 2005); Hinga Norman eta/., Case No. SCSL-2004-14-T, 
Transcript, at 127-28 (Sept. 23, 2004); id., Transcript, at 106 (Sept. 27, 2004); id., Transcript, 
at 3-4 (Nov. 3, 2004); id., Transcript, at 46 (Mar. 14, 2005); Brima et a/., Case No. SCSL-
2004-16-PT, Transcript, at 58 (Mar. 8, 2005); id., Transcript, at 46, 106 (Apr. 7, 2005); id., 
Transcript, at 24-25 (Apr. 8, 2005); id., Transcript, at 7 (June 27, 2005); id. , Transcript, at 6 
(June 29, 2005); id., Transcript, at 96 (June 30, 2005); id., Transcript, at 110 (July 7, 2005); 
id., Transcript, at 74, 80-81, I 09, 117 (July II, 2005); Los Palos Case Notes, supra note 17, at 
34 (July 18, 200 I); id. at 306 (Sept. 28, 200 I). 
25 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, 'I] 436 
(Jan. 27, 2000); Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, Judgment and Sentence, 'I] 
118 (May 16, 2003); Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1 8-T, Transcript, at 67-68 
(Apr. 30, 2004); Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-01-71-T, Transcript, at 35 (Sept. 16, 2003); 
Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-17-T, Transcript, at 29, 39, 70-72 (Sept. 28, 2001); Hinga 
Norman eta/., Case No. SCSL-2004-14-T, Transcript, at 50 (June 21, 2004); id., Transcript, 
at 18 (Feb. 9, 2005); id., Transcript, at 35 (June 3, 2005); Brima eta/., Case No. SCSL-2004-
16-PT, Transcript, at 43 (Mar. 8, 2005); id., Transcript, at 79, 80, 87-88, 90 (June 27, 2005); 
id., Transcript, at 14 (July, I, 2005); id., Transcript, at 108 (July 7, 2005); id., Transcript, at 
17, 76-77 (July II, 2005); id., Transcript, at 5, 12 (July 12, 2005); id., Transcript, at 34 (July 
14, 2005); id., Transcript, at 106 (July 18, 2005); id., Transcript, at 53-54 (Sept. 19, 2005); 
Sesay eta/., SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at II , 46 (July 22, 2004); id., Transcript, at 17 (July 
27, 2004); id., Transcript, at 32 (Oct. 5, 2004); id. , Transcript, at 53, 67, 72, 73, 74 (Oct. 18, 
2004); id., Transcript, at 94-95 (Oct. 21 , 2004); Taylor, Case No. SCSL 2003-01-T, Tran-
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problematic. So, for instance, witnesses have difficulty saying how long a 
particular attack lasted or how many attackers participated. And sometimes 
counsel try to elucidate or test a witness's account by means of maps, photo-
graphs, sketches and other two-dimensional representations, but the wit-
nesses often cannot make sense out of them. 26 Defense counsel show wit-
nesses these representations to see if the witness was even present at the site, 
but if the witness says she cannot understand the picture, then there is no 
way to tell if she was there or not. Even if the Trial Chamber is sure that the 
witness was there, it might wish to pinpoint her exact location in order to as-
sess the weight to give to her testimony. One ICTR witness, for instance, 
was able to point out her position on a photograph of a stadium, and because 
she was able to do so, the Trial Chamber was able to determine that she 
would have had a hard time identifying anyone located where the witness 
said the defendant was located. 27 
In the foregoing examples, witnesses did not answer questions because 
they claimed not to know the answers to those questions. But sometimes 
questions go unanswered because witnesses do not understand the questions 
they are asked or the Western court personnel do not understand the answers 
that they receive. Sometimes the witness will not understand the terminolo-
gy used in the question, 28 and other times it is the form of the question that 
script, at 6667 (Apr. 4, 2008); Los Palos Case Notes, supra note 17, at 119 (Aug. 2, 200 I). 
26 See, e.g .. Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-17-T, Transcript, at 126-27 (Sept. 24, 2001); 
id., Transcript, at 8-11 (Sept. 25, 2001); Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-T, Transcript, 
at 88-90 (Sept. 12, 2001) (on file with author); id. Transcript, at 32 (Sept. 19, 2001); id., Tran-
script, at 29-31 (Sept. 24, 2001); id., Transcript, at4-7, 10,26 (Feb. 14, 2002); id., Transcript, 
at 84 (Sept. II, 2002); id., Transcript, at 130 (Feb. 13, 2002); id., Transcript, at 108-09 (Sept. 
4, 200 I); Kajelije/i, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Transcript, at 58 (Dec. 12, 200 I) (on file with 
author); Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, ~~ 380, 436, 838 (Jan. 
27, 200); Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR 96-14-T, Judgment and Sentence, ~ 151 (May 16, 
2003); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Transcript, at 41 (Oct. 27, 2007) (on 
file with author); Hinga Norman eta!., Case No. SCSL-2004-14-T, Transcript, at 38 (Nov. 4, 
2004 ); Los Palos Case Notes, supra note 17, at 78 (July 26, 200 I). AFRC witness TF 1-15 7 
similarly testified that he had never seen a map or a chart. Brima et a!., Case No. SCSL-
2004-16-PT, Transcript, at 29 (July 25, 2005). 
27 Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-IA-T, Judgment,~~ 648-49 (June 7, 2001). 
28 See, e.g .. Taylor, Case No. SCSL 2003-01-T, Transcript, at 14278 (Aug. 21, 2008); id., 
Transcript, at I6328-3I (Sept. I6, 2008); Hinga Norman eta!., Case No. SCSL-2004-I4-T, 
Transcript, at I9 (Feb. 9, 2005); Brima eta!., Case No. SCSL-2004-I6-PT, Transcript, at III-
I2 (June 30, 2005); Sesay eta!., SCSL-04-I5-T, Transcript, at 20 (July 28, 2004); id., Tran-
script, at 79-80 (Oct. 6, 2004); id., Transcript, at I99 (Oct. 8, 2004); id., Transcript, at 58-59, 
II3-I4, 142 (Oct. II, 2004); Hinga Norman eta!., Case No. SCSL-2004-I4-T, Transcript, at 
60 (June I5, 2004); id., Transcript, at 26-27 (June I6, 2004). See also Hinga Norman eta!., 
Case No. SCSL-2004-I4-T, Transcript, at I6-I7 (June I8, 2004 ); id., Transcript, at 65 (Nov. 8 
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gives rise to the difficulties. Compound questions have proven especially 
problematic, and judges at the international tribunals have frequently had to 
remind counsel to divide up their questions into smaller, more intelligible 
parts. So, for instance, one witness could not answer the following question: 
"when ... the Kamajors told you that Chief Norman was coming to talk to 
them were you eager to go and hear Chief Norman?" Consequently, one of 
the judges reformulated the question into the following series of questions: 
President: You know [ChiefNorman] very well, huh? .... 
Witness: Yes, sir. 
President: Right. He is your chief? 
Witness: Yes, sir. 
President: He was coming to hold a meeting with you. 
Witness: Yes, sir. 
President: Were you happi;; to go to the meeting? 
Witness: Yes, I was glad. 9 
In other cases, it is not entirely clear what the problem is, but it is clear 
that there is some problem because the witness's answer will not in any way 
match counsel's question. 30 In other cases, the confusion-or some sort of 
communication difficulty-will become apparent because counsel must ask 
a question multiple times in order to get a responsive answer from the wit-
ness. 
31 And it is not infrequent that counsel never gets a pertinent answer as 
2004); Brima eta/., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Transcript at 21-22 (Apr. 6, 2005). 
29 Hinga Norman eta/., Case No. SCSL-2004-14-T, Transcript, at 18-19 (June 18, 2004). 
30 Lolotoe Case Notes, supra note 17, at 4 (Nov. 4, 2002); id. at 8 (Apr. 8, 2002); Los Palos 
Case Notes, supra note 17, at 156 (Aug. 14, 2001); Hinga Norman eta/., Case No. SCSL-
2004-14-T, Transcript, at 28 (Nov. 2, 2004); id., Transcript, at 22 (Sept. 21, 2004); Brima et 
a/., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Transcript, at 37 (June 28, 2005); id., Transcript, at 64 (June 
27, 2005); id., Transcript, at 81 (July 7, 2005); id., Transcript, at 102 (Mar. 8, 2005); id., 
Transcript, at 96-97 (Apr. 7, 2005); id., Transcript, at 40 (Apr. 6, 2005); Sesay eta/., SCSL-
04-15-T, Transcript, at 15 (July 21, 2004); id., Transcript, at 6, 8, 47, 48,50 (July 22, 2004); 
id., Transcript, at 52 (July 27, 2004); id., Transcript, at 29 (July 28, 2004); id., Transcript, at 
89 (Oct. 6, 2004); id., Transcript, at 56, 57-58 (Oct. 21, 2004); id., Transcript, at 2-3 (Oct. 22, 
2004); Taylor, Case No. SCSL 2003-01-T, Transcript, at 7423, 7533-34 (Apr. 14, 2008); id., 
Transcript, at 8536 (Apr. 24, 2008); Taylor, Case No. SCSL 2003-01-T, Transcript, at 14257 
(Aug. 21, 2008); id., Transcript, at 15441-42 (Sept. 4, 2008); id., Transcript, at 15708 (Sept. 
8, 2008); Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-T, Transcript, at 12 (Jan. 21, 2003); Ndinda-
bahizi, Case No. ICTR-0 1-71-T, Transcript, at 3 (Sept. 15, 2003); Ntakirutimana, Case No. 
ICTR-96-17-T, Transcript, at 82 (Sept. 24, 2001). 
31 Taylor, Case No. SCSL 2003-01-T, Transcript, at 767-74 (Jan. 9, 2008); id., Transcript, at 
6765-66 (Apr. 7, 2008); id., Transcript, at 7543-44 (Apr. 14, 2008); id., Transcript, at 8616-18 
(Apr. 25, 2008); id., Transcript, at 9563, 10100-05 (May 12, 2008); id., Transcript, at 10212-
15 (May 19, 2008); id., Transcript, at 10246-47 (May 20, 2008); id., Transcript, at 14888-90, 
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witnesses frequently seem to talk around the relevant topics. 
A final problem concerns testimony that is inconsistent with previous 
statements. Investigators interview witnesses before they come to court, and 
they draft written statements ostensibly containing the information that the 
witnesses conveyed to them. The problem is that a substantial proportion of 
witnesses testify inconsistently with their written statements or with their in-
court testimony in previous cases. While some of these inconsistencies are 
trivial, many are not. As my book reveals, the inconsistencies cover a wide 
range of information. Discrepancies are particularly apt to appear in testi-
mony that concerns dates, distance, duration, numerical estimations and the 
other sorts of key details that international witnesses have such trouble pro-
viding. 32 In other cases, the inconsistencies relate to the specific facts of the 
14892-95, 14900-02 (Aug. 28, 2008); id., Transcript, at 15835-36 (Sept. 9, 2008); id., Tran-
script, at 15905-06 (Sept. 10, 2008); Hinga Norman eta/., Case No. SCSL-2004-14-T, Tran-
script, at 49-51, 55-56 (Sept. 21, 2004); id., Transcript, at 4-10 (June 18, 2004); id., Tran-
script, at 106-07 (Nov. 26, 2004); id., Transcript, at 5-8 (Feb. 15, 2005); id., Transcript, at 
137-38 (Feb. 17, 2005); id., Transcript, at 49-54 (Mar. I, 2005); Brima eta/., Case No. SCSL-
2004-16-PT, Transcript, at 46-47 (Apr. 6, 2005); id., Transcript, at 21, 26, 73-75 (Apr. 8, 
2005); id., Transcript, at 108-10 (June 27, 2005); id., Transcript, at I 10-12, 119-20 (June 28, 
2005); id., Transcript, at 22-23 (July 5, 2005); id., Transcript, at 62 (July 7, 2005); id., Tran-
script, at 113, 134-35, 145-46 (July II, 2005); id., Transcript, at 14, 40-42, 67 (Sept. 22, 
2005); id., Transcript, at 13-17, 23-24, 39-41 (Sept. 23, 2005); Sesay eta/., SCSL-04-15-T, 
Transcript, at 38 (July 14, 2004); id., Transcript, at 31-32 (July 21, 2004); id., Transcript, at 
66, 68-69 (July 27, 2004); id., Transcript, at 48-50 (Oct. 5, 2004); id., Transcript, at 82-91 
(Oct. 6, 2004); id., Transcript, at 58-60 (Oct. 7, 2004); id., Transcript, at 23-24, 121-25 (Oct. 
II, 2004); id., Transcript, at 34-35 (Oct. 20, 2004); id., Transcript, at 16-17, 23-28 (Apr. 8, 
2005); id., Transcript, at 24, 41 (Apr. 15, 2005); id., Transcript, at 40-42 (July 7, 2005); Lolo-
toe Case Notes, supra note 17, at 4-5 (Apr. 8, 2002); id. at 3 (Oct. 28, 2002); Karera, Case 
No. ICTR-0 1-74-T, Transcript, at 49-50 (Feb. I, 2006); Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-0 1-71-
T, Transcript, at 16-18 (Sept. 16, 2003); Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-0 1-71-T, Transcript, at 
16-17 (Sept. 15, 2003); Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-T, Transcript, at 8-10 (May 6, 
2002); Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-17-T, Transcript, at 132-33 (Sept. 24, 2001 ); id., 
Transcript, at 7-8 (Sept. 25, 2001); id., Transcript, at 30-31 (Sept. 27, 2001); id., Transcript, at 
3-4, 7-8 (Oct. 23, 2001); id., Transcript, at 20-21 (Oct. 25, 2001); Los Palos Case Notes, su-
pra note 17, at 39 (July 18, 200 I). Arnold Brackman recounts numerous instances in which 
Japanese defendants and witnesses before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
"circled" questions without answering them. See, e.g., ARNOLD C. BRACKMAN, THE OTHER 
NUREMBERG 287, 294-95 (1987). 
32 Los Palos Case Notes, supra note 17, at 192 (Aug. 22, 200 I); id. at 206 (Aug. 23, 200 I); 
Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-IB-T, Judgment and Sentence, "1!27 (Apr. 28, 
2005); id., Judgment and Sentence, "11"11 269-70 (Apr. 28, 2005); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case 
No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, "1!"1!225-26, 236 (Sept. 2, 1998); Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. 
ICTR-01-76-T, Judgment and Sentence, "ll'lfl67, 169, 382 (Dec. 13, 2005); Niyitegeka, Case 
No. ICTR-96-14-T, Judgment and Sentence,~~ 59,60 65, 99, 102, 167,277,278, 306 (May 
HeinOnline -- 14 UCLA J. Int'l L. Foreign Aff. 248 2009
248 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 235 (2009) 
crime 33 and sometimes pertain to fundamental aspects of the witness's ac-
16, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment and Sentence, '\1680 
(Dec. I, 2003); Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-00-55A-T, Judgment and Sentence, '\1 
171 (Sept. 12, 2006); Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, '\1'\1385-87 
(Jan. 27, 2000); Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-200 1-64-T, Judgment, '\1 123 (June 
17, 2004); Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-IA-T, Judgment, 'll'\1403, 412-13 (June 7, 2001); 
Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence, '\1 171 (May 15, 
2003); Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Transcript, at 9-10,22, 30 (Ju-
ly 2, 2003); id., Transcript, at 56, 59-60 (July 3, 2003); Nyiramasuhulw, Case No. ICTR-98-
42-T, Transcript, at 25-30, 32-35, 60-61 (Mar. 20, 2003); Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-9518-
T, Transcript, at 4, 18-19 (Mar. 31, 2004); id., Transcript, at 43-45 (Apr. 19, 2004); Prosecu-
tor v. Karemera et al., Case. No. ICTR-98-44-T, Transcript, at 17-20 (Dec. 5, 2003); Prosecu-
tor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. 99-54A-T, Judgment and Sentence, '\1'\1327, 339 (Jan. 22, 2004); 
id., Transcript, at 62-65 (Sept. 19, 2001); id., Transcript, at 29-30 (Sept. 4, 2002); Prosecutor 
v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Transcript, at 43-47 (Aug. 6, 2003); Taylor, Case 
No. SCSL 2003-01-T, Transcript, at 6079 (Mar. 13, 2008); Hinga Norman eta!., Case No. 
SCSL-2004-14-T, Transcript, at 54 (June 21, 2004); id., Transcript, at 85-87 (Sept. 9, 2004); 
id., Transcript, at 101-03 (Sept. 13, 2004); id., Transcript, at 80-81 (Dec. 6, 2004); id., Tran-
script, at 18 (Feb. 9, 2005; id., Transcript, at 73-75,91-104 (Feb. 22, 2005); id., Transcript, at 
14-19, 24-28 (Mar. 4, 2005); id., Transcript, at 45 (Mar. 8, 2005); Sesay eta!., SCSL-04-15-T, 
Transcript, at 25-26 (July 21, 2004); id., Transcript, at 138-40 (Oct. 8, 2004); id., Transcript, 
at 27-33, 38-40 (Apr. 14, 2005); id., Transcript, at 91, 100 (Apr. 15, 2005); id., Transcript, at 
66-67 (May 12, 2005); id., Transcript, at 29-30 (Nov. 22, 2005); Brima et a!., Case No. 
SCSL-2004-16-PT, Transcript, at 24-27 (Apr. 6, 2005); id., Transcript, at 79 (Apr. 8, 2005); 
id., Transcript, at 34-38, 38-39, 53-60, 63-65, 67-69 (Apr. 12, 2005); id., Transcript, at 52-59 
(Apr. 19, 2005); id., Transcript, at 21-25 (Apr. 20, 2005); id., Transcript, at 53-64 (June 21, 
2005); id., Transcript, at 26-27, 47-48 (June 22, 2005); id., Transcript, at 132-35 (June 23, 
2005); id., Transcript, at 122-23 (June 30, 2005); id., Transcript, at 151-52 (July II, 2005); 
id., Transcript, at 85 (July 12, 2005); id., Transcript, at 82-83, 96 (July 21, 2005); id., Tran-
script, at 96 (July 26, 2006); id., Transcript, at 45-46 (Sept, 19, 2005); Los Palos Case Notes, 
supra note 17, at 109 (Aug. I, 2001); id. at 120 (Aug. 2, 2001); id. at 179 (Aug. 21, 2001); id. 
at 306 (Sept. 28, 2001); Prosecutor v. Paulino de Jesus, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, 
Case No. 6/2002, Judgment, at 10-11 (Dili Dist. Ct., Jan. 28, 2004). 
33 Brima eta!., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Transcript, at 50 (July 7, 2005); id., Transcript, 
at 97-98 (July 26, 2006); Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-01-71-T, Transcript, at 48 (Sept. 29, 
2003); Hinga Norman eta!., Case No. SCSL-2004-14-T, Transcript, at 7-9 (Feb. 25, 2005); 
Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-T, Transcript, at 31-40 (Feb. 14, 2002) (on file with au-
thor); Brima eta!., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Transcript, at 103-04 (June 23, 2005); id., 
Transcript, at III-14 (June 24, 2005); Sesay eta!., SCSL-04-I5-T, Transcript, at 6I-66 (May 
I2, 2005); Taylor, Case No. SCSL 2003-0 I-T, Transcript, at I 089-91 (Jan. II, 2008); Hinga 
Norman eta!., Case No. SCSL-2004-I4-T, Transcript, at 63-72, 152-54 (Sept. 27, 2004); 
Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-I7-T, Transcript, at 74-81 (Sept. 20, 2001); Hinga Nor-
man eta!., Case No. SCSL-2004-I4-T, Transcript, at 28 (Feb. 9, 2005); Kamuhanda, Case 
No. ICTR-99-54A-T, Transcript, at 75-76 (Sept. I9, 2001); Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-
T, Judgment and Sentence, '\1 I7I (May I5, 2003); Prosecutor v. Mpambara, Case No. ICTR-
01-65-T, Judgment, '\1151 (Sept. II, 2006); Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-I3-A, Judgment and 
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Sentence, ~ 811 (Jan. 27, 2000); Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-200 1-64-T, Judgment, at ~ 192 
(June 17, 2004); Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Cases No. ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-17-T, 
Judgment and Sentence,~~ 366-70 (Feb. 21, 2003); Kamuhanda, Case No. 99-54A-T, Judg-
ment and Sentence, ~ 440 (Jan. 22, 2004); Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR-98-
44C-T, Judgment,~ 113 (Sept. 20, 2006); Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment,~ 407 
(Sept. 2, 1998); Bagosora eta/., Case No. JCTR-98-41-T, Transcript, at 24-25, 39-40, 54 (Ju-
ly 4, 2003); Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-17-T, Transcript, at 109-21, 140-41, 142-43 
(Sept. 24, 2001); id., Transcript, at 69-71 (Sept. 27, 2001); Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR-
98-42-T, Transcript, at 43 (Mar. 20, 2003); Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Tran-
script, at 41 (Aug. 6, 2003); Kajelijeli, Case No. JCTR-98-44A-T, Transcript, at 97-107 (Dec. 
II, 2001) (on file with author); Karemera eta!., Case. No. ICTR-98-44-T, Transcript, at 65 
(Dec. 8, 2003); Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-T, Transcript, at 46 (Sept. 4, 2001) (on 
file with author); id., Transcript, at 77-79 (Jan. 3I, 2002); id., Transcript, at 92-94 (Feb. 7, 
2002); Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-IB-T, Transcript, at 29-3I (Apr. I, 2004); id., Tran-
script, at 32, 34-36 (Apr. 7, 2004); id., Transcript, at 26-29, 36, 48-50 (Apr. 8, 2004); id., 
Transcript, at 20 (Apr. 20, 2004); id., Transcript, at 47-49, 54-55 (Apr. 30, 2004); id., Tran-
script, at 80-SI (Sept. 26, 200 I); Taylor, Case No. SCSL 2003-0 I-T, Transcript, at 2118-24, 
2I30-32, 2134-36 (Jan. 24, 2008); id., Transcript, at 6096-97, 6100-0 I, 6133-36 (Mar. 14, 
2008); Hinga Norman eta/., Case No. SCSL-2004-I4-T, Transcript, at II-12 (June 18, 2004 ); 
id., Transcript, at I08 (Sept. 9, 2004); id., Transcript, at I23-30 (Nov. 2, 2004); id., Tran-
script, at 52-59 (Nov. 3, 2004); id., Transcript, at 4-8, I2, 13-14 (Nov. 4, 2004); id., Tran-
script, at 52-53 (Nov. 30, 2004); id., Transcript, at 32-34 (Feb. 14, 2005); id., Transcript, at 
108-10 (Feb. 22, 2005); id., Transcript, at 25-30 (Feb. 25, 2005); id., Transcript, at 94 (Mar. 4, 
2005); Sesay eta/., SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 1-3 (July I5, 2004); id., Transcript, at 77, 
86-87 (July 19, 2004); id., Transcript, at 27,30-32 (July 21, 2004); id., Transcript, at 37-38 
(July 22, 2004); id., Transcript, at 154-70 (Oct. 7, 2004); id., Transcript, at I56-63 (Oct. II, 
2004); id., Transcript, at 86-87 (Jan. 13, 2005); id., Transcript, at 66-67, 68-73 (Feb. 3, 2005); 
id., Transcript, at 101-02 (Apr. 7, 2005); id., Transcript, at 40-41, 46-62, 79 (Apr. 8, 2005); 
id., Transcript, at 8-9, 15, 22,40-41, 56, 60-6I, IOI (Apr. I5, 2005); id., Transcript, at 22,24 
(Apr. 18, 2005); id., Transcript, at 12-I6, 30-32 (July 7, 2005); id., Transcript, at 40-42, 43-46 
(July 8, 2005); id., Transcript, at 48 (Aug. 2, 2005); id., Transcript, at 32-51 (Nov. 4, 2005); 
id., Transcript, at II-I3 (Nov. 7, 2005); id., Transcript, at 90-95 (Nov. 22, 2005); id., Tran-
script, at 42-57 (Nov. 23, 2005); id., Transcript, at 79, 83-93 (Dec. 5, 2005); id., Transcript, at 
43 (Dec. 8, 2005); Brima eta/., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Transcript, at 12I (Apr. 7, 
2005); id., Transcript, at 40-43, 43-44, 79-80 (Apr. 8, 2005); id., Transcript, at 3-4 (Apr. 12, 
2005); id., Transcript, at 47-48 (Apr. I9, 2005); id., Transcript, at 4 7-49, 51-52 (Apr. 20, 
2005); id., Transcript, at 13-15, 126-28 (June 20, 2005); id., Transcript, at 33-35 (June 2I, 
2005); id., Transcript, at 110 (June 24, 2005); id., Transcript, at 47-49 (June 28, 2005); id., 
Transcript, at 13-16, 18-19 (June 29, 2005); id., Transcript, at 34-35 (July I, 2005); id., Tran-
script, at 57-58 (July 7, 2005); id., Transcript, at 150-51 (July II, 2005); id., Transcript, at IJ-
14, 20-21, 76-77, 78 (July 12, 2005); id., Transcript, at 38-39 (July 14, 2005); id., Transcript, 
at 27, 31, 102-05 (July 18, 2005); Sesay eta/., SCSL-04-I5-T, Transcript, at 19-20, 70-72 (Ju-
ly 27, 2005); Brima eta/., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Transcript, at 13-14 (July 12, 2005); 
id., Transcript, at 12-14 (Sept. 26, 2006); id., Transcript, at 36, 41-47 (Oct. 17, 2005); Lolotoe 
Case Notes, supra note 17, at 4-5 (Apr. II, 2002); id. at 6 (Apr. 12, 2002); id. at 4 (May 7, 
2002); id. at 24 (Nov. 14, 2002); Los Palos Case Notes, supra note 17, at 57 (July 23, 2001); 
id. at 59, 60, 62, 66 (July 24 ,200 I); id. at 83, 90 (July 27, 200 I); id. at 75, 78 (July 26, 200 I); 
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count. To provide just one of many examples, AFRC witness TFI-209's 
statement said that she fled with her 2-year old son but later lost him and has 
never seen him again. She testified, by contrast, that her son was 6 and that 
he was shot and killed in her presence.34 
If discrepancies about the crimes themselves were not worrisome 
enough, witnesses also frequently testify inconsistently about the defen-
dant's involvement in the crime. Sometimes the witness's testimony will in-
culpate the defendant when the statement did not. 35 Akayesu witness Ka-
rangwa testified, for instance, that the defendant shot and killed all three of 
Karangwa's brothers, but his statement says that the defendant shot and 
ki lied one of the witness's brothers but that the other two were killed by ma-
chete by men who were with the defendant. 36 Sometimes, by contrast, the 
later testimony seeks to exculpate, not inculpate. 37 Most worryingly of all 
perhaps, witnesses sometimes testify about the defendant's key involvement 
in the crime, even though the witness's statement, which may feature a de-
tailed description of the crime and surrounding scenes, fails even to mention 
the defendant. 38 
id. at 120, 122, 125 (Aug. 2, 200 I); id. at 145 (Aug. 8, 200 I); id. at 173 (Aug. 21, 200 I); id. at 
190 (Aug. 22, 200 I); id. at 173 (Aug. 21 , 200 I); id. at 226, 229 (Sept. 20, 200 I); id. at 273 
(Sept. 25, 2001); id. at 287 (Sept. 26, 2001); id. at 309 (Sept. 29, 2001); Alison Thompson, 
Special Court Monitoring Program Weekly Report, Update No. 71, U.C. BERKELEY WAR 
CRIMES STUD. CTR., 4-5 (Mar. 3, 2006). 
34 Brim a eta/., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Transcript, at 50 (July 7, 2005). 
35 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment,,;~ 907-08 (June 
20, 2007); Sesay eta/., SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 91-93, 109-17 (Apr. 7, 2005); Hinga 
Norman eta/., Case No. SCSL-2004-14-T, Transcript, at 35-47 (June 3, 2005); Akayesu, Case 
No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment,~ 185 (Sept. 2, 1998); Bagosora eta/., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, 
Transcript, at 32-35 (July 2, 2003); Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-17-T, Transcript, at 
108-11 (Sept. 26, 2001) (on file with author); Taylor, Case No. SCSL 2003-01-T, Transcript, 
at 755-58 (Jan. 8, 2008); Taylor, Case No. SCSL 2003-01-T, Transcript, at 3348-51 (Feb. 7, 
2008); Taylor, Case No. SCSL 2003-01-T, Transcript, at 5974-76 (Mar. 13, 2008); Brima et 
a/., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Transcript, 145-46 (July II, 2005); Prosecutor v. Sesay et 
al. , Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Decision on Sesay Defence Motion to Direct the Prosecutor to 
Investigate the Matter of False Testimony by Witness TF 1-366, ~~ 45-48 (July 25, 2006). 
36 Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment,~ 237 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
37 Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Judgment,~ 192 (June 17, 2004); Brima eta/., 
Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Transcript, at 6-7 (Mar. 9, 2005); Hinga Norman eta/., Case 
No. SCSL-2004-14-T, Transcript, at 48-50 (June 21, 2004). 
38 See, e.g. , Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ~~ 248, 266 (Sept. 2, 1998); Simba, 
Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, Judgment, ~~ 108, 195 (Dec. 13, 2005); Gacumbitsi, Case No. 
ICTR-2001-64-T, Judgment, '1] 54 (June 17, 2004); Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-T, 
Judgment,,;~ 114, 145, 192 (Sept. 20, 2006); Kaje/ijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment 
and Sentence,~ 467 (Dec. I, 2003); Ntakirutimana, Cases No. ICTR-96-1 0 & ICTR-96-17-T, 
HeinOnline -- 14 UCLA J. Int'l L. Foreign Aff. 251 2009
Testimonial Deficiencies and Evidentiary Uncertainties 251 
These sorts of inconsistencies would be troubling enough if they hap-
pened only occasionally. Again, more details are provided in the book, but 
suffice it here to say that in reviewing the transcripts of all of the SCSL cases 
and a handful of ICTR cases, I found that on average, approximately 50 per-
cent of the witnesses testified seriously inconsistently with their past state-
ments. 39 I recognize that my assessment of seriousness is subjective, but I 
have little doubt that the inconsistencies that I considered serious (and in-
deed plenty of those that I did not so consider) are sufficiently grave that 
they would substantially impair the credibility of the witness if he were ap-
pearing in a municipal court. 
II. CAUSES OF THE TESTIMONIAL DEFICIENCIES 
Having summarily canvassed the impediments bedeviling international 
criminal trials, I will now briefly mention some of the causes of those impe-
diments. The causes are of key significance because they affect the Trial 
Chambers' assessment of the testimony. 
Education: The most obvious factor contributing to many of the impe-
diments is lack of education and life experiences. A large percentage of the 
witnesses appearing at the international tribunals are illiterate and have had 
no or virtually no formal education. Thus, many of these witnesses not only 
Judgment and Sentence,~ 255 (Feb. 2I, 2003); Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment 
and Sentence, at ~ 440 (Jan. 27, 2000); Karera, Case No. ICTR-0 1-74-T, Judgment and Sen-
tence,~ 53 (Dec. 7, 2007); Niyitegelw, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, Judgment and Sentence,~~ 
101, 154, 158 (May 16, 2003); Prosecutor v. DaCosta & Punef, Special Panel for Serious 
Crimes, Case No. 22/2003, Judgment, 5 (Dili Dist. Ct., Apr. 25, 2005); Paulino de Jesus, 
Case No. 6/2002, Judgment, at 9 (Jan. 28, 2004); Prosecutor v. Tacaqui, Special Panel for Se-
rious Crimes, Case No. 20/2001, Judgment, 26-27 (Dili Dist. Ct., Dec. 9, 2004); Gacumbitsi, 
Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Transcript, at 22 (Aug. 19, 2003); Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-
44A-T, Transcript, at 27-28 (Dec. 7, 2001); id., Transcript, at 72-96 (Dec. 5, 2001) (in 
French); Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-951 B-T, Transcript, at 55-56 (Mar. 30, 2004 ); id., Tran-
script, at 22-24 (Apr. 29, 2004); Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-17-T, Transcript, at 32-33 
(Sept. 20, 200 I); Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-I4-T, Transcript, at 24-25 
(Aug. I3, 2002) (on file with author); Sesay eta/., SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 18-20 (Oct. 
I9, 2004); id., Transcript, at 95-III (Jan. 24, 2005); id., Transcript, at 36-40 (Feb. 3, 2005); 
id., Transcript, at 77-80, I4I-45 (Mar. 23, 2006); Brima eta/., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, 
Transcript, at I40-50 (July II, 2005); Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-T, Transcript, at 
7I-72 (Sept. I9, 2001) (on file with author); Los Palos Case Notes, supra note I7, at 255-56 
(Sept. I8, 200 I). 
39 Citations to and explanations of the relevant cases can be found in Chapter Four of my 
book, NANCY AMOURY COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONSTRUCTING A 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE APPROACH (2007). 
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do not know how to read and write but also have never been taught to tell 
time, or to measure, for instance. It consequently should come as no surprise 
when these witnesses are unable to answer many of the questions put to 
them. 
Culture: Cultural differences between the witnesses and Western court 
personnel also prove an additional impediment to accurate fact-finding. In-
deed, an inability to answer certain questions may be driven less by educa-
tional factors than by cultural factors. Anthropologist James Littlejohn's re-
search, for instance, suggests that Sierra Leonean and Western notions of 
space differ radically. Littlejohn determined that the Temne people (who 
make up the largest tribe in Sierra Leone) do not view space as either 
"arithmetically measured []or geometrically analysed" but instead break it up 
into units such as "a day's journey," or for shorter distances, "the earshot." 
Littlejohn observes that although Westerners have become so accustomed to 
organizing space through geometrical analysis and arithmetical measure-
ments that it has come to seem the natural thing to do, Temne space is or-
dered otherwise. "The size of a farm for example is arrived at by estimating 
the number of bags of rice it ought to produce, ... [and] [w]hen men hire 
themselves out to hoe for a farmer, the farmer and the labourer agree on an 
area which the labourer should complete in a day's work. The day's work, 
however, consists of completing the area."40 In addition, many cultures do 
not attach particular importance to such objective units of measure, and one 
sees that play out at the international tribunals under study as well. Interna-
tional witnesses frequently express impatience when questioned on such de-
tails, and some make clear that they consider it of little importance to pro-
vide truly accurate answers. Rwandan Witness J, for instance, testified that 
the man who raped her remained on top of her for four hours. When an 
ICTR judge expressed skepticism that it was actually four hours, Witness J 
said: "For me, it was about four hours or maybe one year because the suffer-
ing was too much."41 Similarly, Sierra Leonean witness TF1-012 initially 
testified that a certain rebel returned after "a week." When the witness later 
suggested that the rebel returned after several weeks, counsel pointed out the 
inconsistency. TF 1-012 replied off-handedly, "[ w ]e are native people, that 
which is not up to a month, we call it week [sic]."42 
Culture can also affect the style of answering questions. A linguistics 
expert testified in one of the ICTR cases that "it is a feature of the Rwandan 
40 James Littlejohn, Temne Space, 36 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. I, 4 ( 1963). 
41 Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Transcript, at 48 (Mar. II, 1999) (on file 
with author). 
42 Sesay eta/., SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 70 (Feb. 3, 2005). 
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culture that people are not always direct in answering questions, especially if 
the question is delicate."43 That is certainly a useful piece of information for 
the Trial Chambers to have. Because Western speech patterns tend to be 
more direct, witnesses who provide indirect, circuitous answers are often 
thought at best to lack confidence in their perceptions and at worst to be de-
ceptive. Such inferences are obviously not appropriate with respect to wit-
nesses from certain cultures, but because the trial judges are not intimately 
familiar with the culture in question, they are left not knowing what speech 
signals or kinds of demeanor would legitimately give rise to concern. 
Taboos can likewise prevent clear, forthright testimony. In the Los Pa-
los case at the Special Panels, for instance, one of the defendants was ques-
tioned as to who had been on a bus during an ambush. After naming seven 
people, the prosecutor asked whether an individual named Harasio, who had 
subsequently been killed, had also been on the bus. The defendant refused to 
give a clear answer, and a frustrating exchange between the prosecutor and 
the defendant was ended only when East Timorese defense counsel informed 
the court of a "cultural tradition where you cannot mention dead people. "44 
In this case, the taboo was identified, but international criminal tran-
scripts feature so many confusing passages that one has to wonder whether 
unidentified taboos are getting in the way. And even when cultural diver-
gences are identified, they can substantially impair the Trial Chamber's 
ability to assess credibility. For instance, Niyitegeka witness GGO said in 
his statement that a man named Kabanda was "captured and taken to Gitwa 
Hill" to certain leaders including defendant Niyitegeka. In court, however, 
GGO testified that he saw Kabanda being decapitated from his hiding spot in 
the pine forests of Kazirandimwe. The witness insisted that there was no 
discrepancy between his statement and the testimony, however, claiming that 
when he had said that Kabanda had been taken to the leaders on Gitwa Hill, 
he had meant that Kabanda's head had been taken. As he put it: "It was the 
head of the victim which was brought to the leaders, including Niyitigeka ... 
. [W]hen someone is decapitated and is emasculated, for us, it's the individ-
ual as a whole who has passed on, who has disappeared."45 GOO's explana-
tion may well have reflected Rwandan cultural traditions, but judges who 
43 Akayesu, Case No. JCTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ~156 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
44 Los Palos Case Notes, supra note 17, at 33 (July 18, 200 I). For a discussion of the ways in 
which taboos also can complicate Aboriginal witness testimony, see Michael Walsh, Interac-
tional Styles in the Courtroom: An Example from Northern Australia, in LANGUAGE AND THE 
LAW 217, 229-230 (John Gibbons ed., Longman Group UK Limited 1994). 
45 Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, Transcript, at 48 (Aug. 29, 2002) (on file with au-
thor). 
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lack substantial familiarity with those will have little way of knowing. 
Language Interpretation: The need for language interpretation only ex-
acerbates the problems already mentioned. In some tribunals, witness testi-
mony must proceed through multiple translations. In the Special Panels for 
instance, many questions were interpreted from English to Bahasa Indonesia 
to Bunak and then were interpreted back again when the witness answered. 
Similarly, the ICTR has few interpreters who can translate directly from Ki-
nyarwanda to English, so interpreters typically interpret from Kinyarwanda 
to French and then from French to English.46 Each translation increases the 
likelihood of mistakes, and while it is not always easy to determine when in-
terpretation problems are occurring, sometimes witness answers are so un-
responsive that one must suspect inaccurate interpretation. 
Lying: The explanations just canvassed can be deemed "innocent." Al-
though testimonial deficiencies caused by educational, cultural and linguistic 
factors may well impair the defendant's ability to present a defense, because 
vague, undetailed testimony is testimony that is less easy to rebut, these 
causes do not call the witness's credibility into question. If the witness has 
never learned to tell time, she won't know what time the crime occurred. If 
the witness's relevant cultural norms give rise to circuitous speech, the wit-
ness's testimony will seem evasive but in fact will not be. The problem is 
that many of these same phenomena can also be plausibly explained as pur-
poseful efforts to conceal. 
Indeed, the very fact that questioning at the international tribunals seems 
so frequently bedeviled by educational deficits, interpretation errors, and cul-
tural divergences means that witnesses can invoke these communication im-
pediments even when they are not at play, as a means of concealing lying, 
inconsistencies or other weaknesses in witness testimony. International wit-
nesses who are falsely accusing a defendant may, for instance, find it most 
profitable to provide a vague account that is devoid of meaningful details. 
Dating events permits a defendant to contradict the witness's testimony, so it 
may prove a safer bet for the witness to claim that he does not know the re-
levant dates. Making distance and numerical estimates can likewise leave a 
witness vulnerable to contradiction, so they too are better left unstated. The 
same goes for the numerous examples of frustrating exchanges and unres-
ponsive responses. While these may reflect a cultural proclivity toward cir-
46 Stephen J. Rapp, Achieving Accountability for the Greatest Crimes: The Legacy of the In-
ternational Tribunals, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 259, 277 (2007); see also Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-
96-4-T, Judgment, at~ 145 (Sept. 2, 1998); Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-T, Tran-
script, at 99 (Sept. 19, 200 I); Alexander Zahar, The ICTR 's "Media" Judgment and the Rein-
vention of Direct and Public Incitement to Genocide, 16 CRIM. L. F. 33,41 n.26 (2005). 
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cuitous answers and generally indirect speech, they may also reflect a wit-
ness's desire to evade the question at hand or at least to buy himself some 
time to consider the answer he wishes to give. It certainly seems to be the 
case that witnesses have more difficulty understanding questions that chal-
lenge their testimony or that highlight their potentially self-interested moti-
vations. Indeed, more than one defense counsel has observed that witnesses 
frequently sail through direct examination but upon cross-examination be-
come "non-understanding, non-educated."47 
There is no way to determine whether a particular testimonial problem 
results from peljury or one of the many innocent explanations, but I have 
been able to evaluate whether peljury seems in general to be a problem at the 
international tribunals, and I conclude that it is. Some witnesses outright 
admit that they lied in their testimony or in their written statements. 48 And 
sometimes the lying becomes apparent just through use of common sense. 
When one Sierra Leonean witness maintained that he was not acquainted 
with another witness and it later turned out that the other witness was his 
47 Hinga Norman eta/., Case No. SCSL-2004-14-T, Transcript, at 79 (Sept. 9, 2004). The 
practice of witness proofing provides an innocent explanation for this phenomenon, if it in 
fact exists, since proofed witnesses would understandably be better able to answer questions 
on direct examination than on cross-examination. For a discussion of the controversy relating 
to witness proofing at the international tribunals, see Ruben Karemaker, B. Don Taylor Ill & 
Thomas Wayde Pittman, Witness Proofing in International Criminal Tribunals: A Critical 
Analysis of Widening Procedural Divergence, 21 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 683 (2008); Kai Ambos, 
'Witness Proofing' Before the International Criminal Court: A Reply to Karemaker, Taylor, 
and Pittman, 21 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 911 (2008); Ruben Karemaker, B. Don Taylor III & Tho-
mas Wayde Pittman, Witness Proofing in International Criminal Tribunals: Response to Am-
bos, 21 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 917 (2008). Defense counsel Charles Margai, who is himself Sier-
ra Leonean, accused a witness of being more intelligent than he wanted the court to believe. 
Hinga Norman eta/., Case No. SCSL-2004-14-T, Transcript, at 48-49 (June 17, 2004). See 
also ICTR/Zigiranyirazo - Bagaragaza Witness Gives the Defence a Hard Time, HIRONDELLE 
NEWS AGENCY, June 15, 2006 (observing that although on direct-examination, the witness 
gave detailed testimony, on cross-examination, he eluded defense counsel's questions and 
"said as little as possible"). 
48 See, e.g., Karemera eta/., Case. No. ICTR-98-44-T, Transcript, at 25-32 (Nov. 17, 2006); 
id., Transcript, at 18-63 (Apr. 14, 2008); Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-1, 
Judgment,~ 73 (Dec. 13, 2006); Prosecutor v. Rukundo, Case No. ICTR-2001-70-T, Decision 
on the Motions Relating to the Scheduled Appearances of Witness BLP and the Defence In-
vestigator,~~ 2, 5 (July 4, 2007); Thijs Bouwknegt, Rwanda's Genocide Tribunal's Witness 
'Hiding, ' RADIO NETH. WORLDWIDE, Oct. 2, 2008, available at 
athttp;/ /static/rnw.nl/migratie/www .rnw.nl/intemationaljustice/tribunals/1 CTR/081 002-ictr-
witness-redirected; Kamuhanda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-A, Judgment, ,;~ 212-
13 (Sept. 19, 2005). 
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son, we can feel confident that he was lying.49 In another case, a Rwandan 
witness claimed that the defendant had killed her sister. It was revealed on 
cross-examination that this witness had testified in Rwandan courts that his 
sister had been killed by another person in a different part of Rwanda. When 
confronted with this inconsistency, the witness maintained that she had been 
testifying in the Rwandan courts about a different sister- both sisters, how-
ever, just happened to have the same Christian name. 5° 
Examples such as these abound, but even in cases where we do not have 
this kind of evidence of lying we would know that perjury is prevalent at the 
ICTR in particular because virtually every ICTR case has featured either an 
alibi or some other form of blatant contradiction between witnesses for the 
defense and for the prosecution. Reviewing ICTR transcripts and judg-
ments, I found that 90 percent of the cases featured at least one example of 
diametrically opposed testimony between one or more witnesses. 51 
49 Hinga Norman eta/., Case No. SCSL-2004-14-T, Transcript, at 37-38 (Dec. 7, 2004). See 
also Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-T, Judgment, '1!62 (Sept. 20, 2006) (observing it 
"interesting" that witness GIT "claimed not to know whether his brother was testifying in this 
case, although they live near one another and both testified in this case within a short space of 
time"). 
50 Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-T, Judgment, '1!189 (Sept. 20, 2006). 
51 Many of the cases contain more than one example of starkly contradictory testimony. For 
the sake of brevity, however, I list only one for each case. In Kayishema & Ruzindana, pros-
ecution witnesses testified that they saw Kayishema order an attack on the Catholic church in 
Kibuye town on April 17, 1994, Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. JCTR-95-
1-T, Judgment, '1!'11328-30 (May 21, 1999), while Kayishema's wife testified that Kayishema 
was in hiding with her from April 16 to April 20, 1994, id. '1!245. In Musema, prosecution 
witness F testified that he saw Musema at Muyira Hill on May 13, 1994, taking part in a 
large-scale attack on the Tutsi. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, 'II 
404 (Jan. 27, 2000). Defense witness MH, however, testified to having met Musema in Ru-
bona on May 13, 1994. !d. '1!329. In Ndindabahizi, both prosecution witness CGH and de-
fense witness DN were hiding in the home of Augustin Karara, bourgmestre of Gitesi Com-
mune. Whereas witness CGH testified that he observed Ndindabahizi come to Karara's house 
at the end of April and was in the room when Ndindabahizi admonished Karara not to spare 
any Tutsis, Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. JCTR-01-71-1, Judgment and Sentence, '11'11 
183-85 (July 15, 2004), witness DN testified that witness CGH would hide in his room when-
ever there were visitors, and he testified that Ndindabahizi did not visit Karara's house until 
June, well after witness CGH had fled, id. 'II 199. Ntakirutimana featured contradictory testi-
mony with respect to allegations against both defendants accused in that case. Prosecution 
witness KK testified that he saw Elizaphan Ntakirutimana at the ESI Chapel massacre site on 
April 16 between 9:00 a.m. and 9:30 a.m., while prosecution witnesses GG and HH testified 
that they saw Gerard Ntakirutimana shoot and kill Charles Ukobizaba on April 161h between 
noon and I :00 p.m. Ntakirutimana, Cases No. ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-17-T, Judgment and 
Sentence, at '11'11 344-346, 365-366 (Feb. 21, 2003). Defense witness 4, by contrast, testified 
that he and several others, including Elizaphan and Gerard Ntakirutimana left for Gishyita 
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before 8:00am on the morning of April 16. !d. at "11"1!258-59, 328. In Kaje/ijeli, prosecution 
witness GOO testified that she witnessed the brutal rape and killing of her daughter. Defense 
witness RHU30 testified that the witness's daughter had been killed but not raped and that the 
witness had not been present during the attack on her daughter. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-
98-44A-T, Judgment and Sentence, at "1!680 (Dec. I, 2003). In Rutaganda, prosecution wit-
ness H testified as to seeing Rutaganda on April II, 1994, during various episodes of vi-
olence. Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment & Sentence, "11"11 276-77 
(Dec. 6, 1999). Defense witness DOD testified that she and Rutaganda arrived in Kiyovu at 
9:00 a.m. on April II, 1994, and stayed with a friend who was living there until about midday 
on that same day. According to witness DOD, she and Rutaganda then traveled to Masango, 
arriving there at about 6:00p.m. !d. "1!155. In Semanza, prosecution witness VF testified see-
ing Semanza during a massacre in Rugende at 10:00 a.m. on April 10, 1994. Semanza, Case 
No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence, at "1!150 (May 15, 2003). Defense witness PFM 
testified, however, that she accompanied Semanza to Gitarama town around 9:00 or I 0:00 
a.m. on April I oth and remained in the market with him every day. She maintained that he 
never left her except to go to the bathroom. !d. "1!122. In Ntagerura eta/., prosecution wit-
ness MZ testified that while hiding out in his tea plantation in Cyangugu on April 17, he heard 
Ntagerura give a speech, calling for the extermination of the Tutsi. Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et 
al., Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Judgment and Sentence, "1!"1!153-54 (Feb. 25, 2004). However, 
defense witness Nkurunziza testified that Ntagerura was with him on April 16 and 17, attend-
ing cabinet meetings on Murambi Hill. /d. "II 162. As for Ntagerura's co-defendant, Imani-
shimwe, prosecution witness LAK testified that Imanishimwe arrived at a roadblock outside 
ofLAK's workplace on April 9, 1994. Once there, according to LAK, Imanishimwe provided 
weapons to soldiers at the roadblock. !d. "11"11 443-44. Defense witness PCG, who worked at 
the roadblock, contradicted LAK's testimony, stating that the roadblock was not located in 
front of LAK's workplace but was a kilometer away. PCG further testified that he and the 
others manning the roadblock did not receive any weapons or any visits from officials on 
April 9, 1994. /d. "1!475. In Mpambara, the testimonies of prosecution witness AHY and de-
fense witness, Elizabeth Hardinge, conflicted regarding Mpambara's whereabouts on the 
morning of April 9, 1994. AHY had Mpambara at the Paris Centre, distributing weapons and 
encouraging the killing of Tutsi, while Hardinge had Mpambara at Karubamba and subse-
quently back at Gahini. Mpambara, Case No. ICTR-01-65-T, Judgment, "1!"1!122-23 (Sept. II, 
2006). Rwamakuba featured numerous instances of divergent testimonies between prosecu-
tion and defense witnesses. As one example, a number of prosecution witnesses testified that 
they were at Butare University Hospital when Rwamakuba came in and killed some Tutsi pa-
tients. Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-T, Judgment, "1!163 (Sept. 20, 2006). Defense 
witnesses I/1 and 911, however, testified that on the dates that prosecution witnesses placed 
Rwamakuba at the hospital, he was in fact with them at Gisenyi. !d. "1!197. Prosecution wit-
ness YH in Simba testified that on April 21, 1994, Simba encouraged a crowd of Hutu assai-
lants to kill Tutsi in anticipation of a massacre that occurred in Kaduha Parish. Simba, Case 
No. ICTR-01-76-T, Judgment and Sentence, "1!142 (Dec. 13, 2005). Defense witness AJTI 
contradicted that testimony by testifying that Simba was with her during the Kaduha Parish 
massacre. !d. "II 367. Two of the three defendants accused in the Nahimana case were the 
subject of contradictory witness testimony. Several prosecution witnesses testified that they 
saw defendant Ngeze on April 7, 1994, distributing weapons and the like. Prosecutor v. Na-
himana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, "1!825 (Dec. 3, 2003). Ngeze 
maintained that he had been arrested on April 6 and had not been released until April 9, an 
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alibi that was supported by several defense witnesses. /d. ~ 826-28. Prosecution witness 
AEN testified that Ngeze's co-defendant Nahimana appeared at a meeting on March 29, 1994, 
during which he expressed his hatred for Tutsi and called for their extermination. /d. ~ 622. 
Nahimana's wife and doctor, however, testified that Nahimana was home, sick with malaria, 
on March 29. As a result of this illness, Nahimana's doctor testified that it would have been 
impossible for Nahimana to travel anywhere. !d. ~~ 628-29. In Seromba, Prosecution witness 
CDL testified that Seromba participated in a security meeting held on April II, 1994. Serom-
ba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-1, Judgment,~ 68 (Dec. 13, 2006); Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case 
No. ICTR-0 1-66-T, Transcript, at 57 (Jan. 19, 2005). Defense witnesses FE27 and CF 23 tes-
tified, by contrast, that Seromba did not attend the meeting but submitted a letter, which was 
read at the meeting. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-200 1-66-I, Judgment, ~~ 70-71 (Dec. 13, 
2006). In Bagilishema, some contradictory testimony was proffered by two sets of prosecu-
tion witnesses. Witnesses A and AC placed the defendant at the Gitwaro Stadium in Kibuye 
town - where thousands of Tutsi refugees were detained and mistreated - at 9:00 a.m. on 
April 14'h, while two other prosecution witnesses alleged that he was 16 kilometers away in 
Mabanza commune at just that time. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-IA-T, Judgment,~~ 
544-53 (June 7, 2001). In Muvunyi. prosecution witness CCR testified that Muvunyi con-
vened meetings at Nyantanga Trade Center on April 20 and 21, 1994, during which he called 
on the audience to fight the Inyenzi. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-T, Judgment and 
Sentence,~ 160-61 (Sept. 12, 2006). A number of defense witnesses who lived and worked at 
the Nyantanga Trade Center testified that no meeting took place there in April 1994. !d. ~ 
174. Muhimana prosecution witness BC placed Muhimana at the scene of a gruesome attack 
at Ngendombi Hill on April I 0, 1994. She testified that, in addition to launching a grenade 
that killed a number ofTutsi, Muhimana killed BC's children and cut off her hand. Muhima-
na, Case No. ICTR-95-IB-T, Judgment and Sentence,~~ 57-58. Defense witness TQI testi-
fied, by contrast, that Muhimana attended his son's funeral on April IO'h and remained at his 
home until April 161h. !d.~ 59; Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-951B-T, Transcript, at 3-4, 12, 15 
(Aug. 23, 2004). In Gacumbitsi, prosecution witnesses testified that, on April 13, 1994, Ga-
cumbitsi ordered his tenants to leave the house he owned, and intimated that the house was 
not meant for Tutsis. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-200 1-64-T, Judgment, at~~ 179, 181 (June 
17, 2004). However, defense witness UPT testified that Gacumbitsi did not expel his tenants. 
!d. ~ 182; Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Transcript, at 22-23, (Oct. 16, 2003). In 
Karera. prosecution witnesses placed Karera in Kigali-Ville and Rural Kigali prefectures on 
various dates in April 1994, while defense witnesses testified that he was with them in Ru-
hengeri prefecture on those dates. Karera, Case No. ICTR-01-74-T, Judgment and Sentence, 
~~ 457-58, 460 (Dec. 7, 2007). Prosecution witness AMA in Rukundo testified that the de-
fendant along with several soldiers had removed from the CND compound in a minibus fif-
teen refugees who were never seen again. Prosecutor v. Rukundo, Case No. ICTR-200 1-70-
T, Judgment,~~ 397-98 (Feb. 27, 2009). Rukundo defense witness CNB, by contrast, accused 
witness AMA of "telling lies" and maintained that "he saw every vehicle that came to the 
CND" and he never saw Rukundo or any blue minibus. !d. ~~ 424-25. In Zigiranyirazo. 
prosecution witness A VY testified that he had attended a meeting at Umuganda Stadium in 
the last week of April 1994, during which a helicopter arrived carrying Zigiranyirazo. Ac-
cording to witness AVY, Zigiranyirazo took the podium and encouraged the people to contin-
ue killing Tutsi . Prosecutor v. Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-0 1-73-T, Judgment, ~~ 150-51 
(Dec. 18, 2008). One prosecution witness and four defense witnesses corroborated A VY's 
testimony that a meeting had occurred and that certain of the speakers that A VY mentioned 
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Certainly, some of the instances of contradictory testimony probably reflect 
poor memory and perception, rather than perjury, but conflicting testimony 
is so prevalent in ICTR cases that it would be hard to dismiss a11-{)r even a 
significant percentage of it-as the result of honest mistakes. 
I have thus far shown that international tribunal testimony is deficient in 
many respects, and while there are many innocent factors that can plausibly 
explain these deficiencies, there also exist less-innocent explanations that are 
had addressed the crowd, but these five witnesses each testified that Zigiranyirazo had not 
attended the meeting. !d. '1!156. In Kalimanzira, prosecution witness AZT testified that Ka-
limanzira spoke at a meeting at the market square in Nyirakanywero and instructed the people 
to fight the "accomplices" with all their energy. Prosecutor v. Kalimanzira, Case No. ICTR-
05-88-T, Judgment, '11'11 259-61 (June 22, 2009). Several defense witnesses, by contrast, de-
nied that Kalimanzira was present at the meeting. /d. '11'11273-77. In Nchamihigo, prosecution 
witnesses BRF, LAG and LDC testified that they witnessed Nchamihigo's involvement in the 
murder of Father Boneza, while defense witnesses who also saw the killing denied that 
Nchamihigo was present. Prosecutor v. Nchamihigo, Case No. ICTR-01-63-T, Judgment and 
Sentence, '11'11135-40 (Nov. 12, 2008). Prosecution witness BKW in Bikindi testified that Bi-
kindi had participated in the military training of a selected group of Interahamwe by French 
soldiers in Gabiro, Mutara region, around 1992-1993. However, defense witness Jean Bcr-
chmans Hakorimana, a former Rwandan military member, explained that he had received 
training at the training center from the French, but he stated that the Gabiro training centre 
was reserved uniquely for the military and that no Interahamwe were trained there. Prosecu-
tor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-0 1-72-T, Judgment, '11'11 96-98 (Dec. 2, 2008). Bagosora eta!., 
featured contradictions pertaining to each of the defendants. For instance, prosecution wit-
ness LAI testified that he was present when defendant Kabiligi addressed lnterahamwe youth 
and helped Kabiligi to offload weapons from a helicopter. Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., Case 
No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgment and Sentence, '11'11 260-62 (Dec. 18, 2008). By contrast, some 
defense witnesses whom LAI had placed at the same locations denied having been there, and 
documentary evidence showed Kabiligi to be out of the country at the time LAI placed him at 
the above events. /d. at '11'1!265-73. As for defendant Bagosora, prosecution witnesses testi-
fied that he encouraged the killing of Tutsi at one or more meetings at the beginning of June 
1994, id. '11'111680, 1697, while defense witnesses testified that Bagosora was traveling abroad 
with them during that period, id. '11'11 1684, 1949, 1951-54, 1959. With respect to defendant 
Nsengiymva, prosecution witness DO testified that he was with Nsengiyumva at the Gisenyi 
military camp on April 7, 1994, at 8:30a.m, id. 'II 1014, while defense witness LSK-1, a 
neighbor of witness DO, maintained that he spent the entire morning of April 7 with DO, so 
that "it was impossible for Witness DO to have attended a meeting at Gisenyi military camp 
on the morning of 7 April 1994, as he was in his company at this time," id. '1!1031. Finally, 
prosecution witness AH testified that at about I 0:00 a.m. on April 8, he saw Ntabakuze, ac-
companied by members of the Para Commando Battalion, driving slowly through the area in a 
blue Toyota Hilux and supervising the killings. Witness AH testified that he had a conversa-
tion with Ntabakuze. !d. 'II 912. Defense witness Colonel Dewez, the commander of 
UNAMIR's Kigali Battalion referred to the Kigali Battalion's Chronique, a daily record of 
the activities of the Belgian UNAMIR contingent from April6 to 19, 1994, and it showed that 
Ntabakuze was with U.N. officers on the morning of April 8. /d. ~'1!915-17. 
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equally plausible. How much we need to worry about this state-of-affairs, 
however, depends on the overall nature and quantity of the evidence support-
ing the international criminal convictions. 
Unfortunately, the news here is not good. Unlike at Nuremberg, where 
prosecutors submitted literally thousands of documents to the Tribunal, the 
evidence received by current international tribunals almost exclusively 
comes in the form of witness testimony. Further, many key facts in any giv-
en case are attested to by only one or two eyewitnesses. And finally, be-
cause most recent mass atrocities have taken place in oral societies, defense 
counsel have little ability to challenge the prosecutors' eyewitnesses except 
by presenting more eyewitnesses. 
Indeed, unlike the Nuremberg Tribunal, which received from the prose-
cution reams of documents that proved beyond any shadow of a doubt the 
defendants' commission of certain acts, the ICTR, SCSL and Special Panels 
operate in a fact-finding fog of inconsistent, vague and sometimes incoherent 
testimony that leaves them unable to say with any measure of certainty who 
did what to whom. Perhaps Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda led an attack against 
the Tutsi at the Gikomero Parish Church, as alleged by the prosecution, but 
the only evidence that he did comes from alleged eyewitnesses, and the de-
fense has a passel of its own witnesses who claim that Kamuhanda was with 
them, far from the massacre site. Perhaps Alex Tamba Brima was com-
mander of the AFRC troops in the Kono district in May 1998, as the prose-
cution claims, but he and defense witnesses maintain that he was in RUF 
custody at that time. 52 No forensic evidence is available to inform these 
questions, and the traditional means that judges employ to evaluate the cre-
dibility of witness testimony are un-illuminating because they presuppose 
similarities in language and culture between judges and witnesses that simp-
ly do not exist in the international context. Witnesses fail to answer ques-
tions, and we cannot know whether it is because they do not know the an-
swers, or because they do not wish to provide them. Witnesses testify 
haltingly and dance around the relevant topics, and we cannot know whether 
they do so because that is their normal pattern of speech, because they do not 
understand the questions they have been asked, because they have in fact 
answered directly but a mistranslation has created a seeming divergence be-
tween question and answer, or because the witness purposely wishes to 
evade the question. And there is no possibility of knowing what to make of 
the many inconsistencies between witness testimony and pre-trial statements 
that pervade international criminal proceedings. Witnesses attribute these 
52 Brima eta/., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Judgment, ~~ 335-41 (Feb. 18, 2005). 
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inconsistencies to investigators' errors. Defense counsel attribute them to 
witness mendacity. And each explanation, along with a host of others, is 
plausible. 
Ill. IMPLICATIONS OF THE TESTIMONIAL DEFICIENCIES 
The testimonial deficiencies that I have described above have senous 
implications for the way in which we conceptualize international criminal 
fact-finding. In my book, I argue international criminal trials are a much less 
reliable fact-finding mechanism than they appear on the surface. I will brief-
ly discuss that conclusion in Section A, and will then go on to describe the 
Trial Chambers' own assessment of the testimonial deficiencies in Section 
B. That discussion reveals that the judges of the ICTR, SCSL and Special 
Panels take a cavalier approach to testimonial deficiencies, and at least par-
tially as a consequence, convict virtually every defendant who comes before 
them. I seek finally in Section C to explain the Trial Chambers' cavalier ap-
proach by invoking organization liability principles derived from the Nu-
remberg Charter. My study also raises various normative questions, which I 
can only touch upon here, but which I thoroughly address in my book. 
A. The Implications ofTestimonial Deficiencies on International Criminal 
Fact-Finding 
International criminal tribunals conduct their trials pursuant to a blend 
of adversarial and inquisitorial criminal procedures. The procedures vary 
slightly from one Tribunal to the next, and they diverge even more markedly 
from domestic procedures that are predominantly adversarial or inquisitori-
al. 53 These differences notwithstanding, international criminal trials, both in 
their broad structural outlines and in their ostensible commitment to Western 
due process norms, very much resemble a domestic criminal trial that might 
53 No domestic system of criminal procedure contains purely adversarial or purely non-
adversarial forms; every system is something of a blend. See. e.g., Mirjan Damaska, Eviden-
tiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 
121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 577 (1973); RichardS. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice Policy, 
in Theory and in Practice, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE lNT'L CONF. FOR THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY 
OF THE lNT'L lNST. OF HIGHER STUD. IN CRIM. SCI., COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: 
FROM DIVERSITY TO RAPPROCHEMENT 109, 112-13 (1998); Patrick L. Robinson, Ensuring 
Fair and Expeditious Trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via, 11 EuR. J. INT'L L. 569, 574 (2000). But despite this hybridization, most systems of do-
mestic criminal procedure are predominantly adversarial or non-adversarial. 
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be held in any Western nation. And therein lies a problem, for while interna-
tional criminal trials appear on the surface to be Western-style trials, they in 
fact constitute a much less reliable fact-finding mechanism. Indeed, the 
Western trial form in which international criminal proceedings cloak them-
selves, embody certain fact-finding expectations that international criminal 
proceedings are unable to fulfill. 
At the most basic level, it is expected that fact witnesses will recount 
their first-hand experiences in a way that is comprehensible to the recipients 
of their testimony and that provides those recipients sufficient information 
about the events in question. That is not to say that witnesses in Western 
domestic trials always attend to and convey key details. Nor is it to say that 
international witnesses never provide a reasonably detailed account of the 
events they witnessed. But they frequently do not, and on the whole, the 
Western trial form embodies the expectation that witnesses will provide a 
more detailed, more thorough account of the events they witnessed than in-
ternational witnesses routinely are able to deliver. 
The use of the Western trial form also conveys the expectation that 
when called upon to decide between competing factual accounts, fact-finders 
will be able to inform their decisions by assessing the credibility of the wit-
nesses who appear before them. Concededly, the value of such credibility 
assessments is open to question even in municipal trials where fact-finders 
and witnesses share the same cultural norms and language. Recent research 
suggests, for instance, that people are not as good at detecting prevarication 
as they think they are. 54 At the international tribunals, however, the cultural 
and linguistic "distance" between fact-finders and witnesses is so vast that it 
leaves fact-finders without any meaningful frame of reference. The use of 
interpreters makes it difficult for fact-finders even to know how the witness 
is testifying; that is, whether the witness is hesitating before answering, for 
instance, or rather is answering expeditiously with seeming confidence. And 
even when that information is known, it is of little value because internation-
al fact-finders cannot know what to make of it. 
The Western trial form also creates the expectation that pre-trial investi-
gations will serve to narrow contested issues both by establishing back-
ground facts and providing an efficacious means of testing witness accounts. 
Investigations are presumed capable of providing fact-finders with a degree 
of certainty about a wide range of issues surrounding those issues that are 
disputed at trial. Investigations are assumed to be capable, moreover, of 
identifying some quantity of witness lying and deterring a great deal more. 
54 Paul Ekman & Maureen O'Sullivan, Who Can Catch a Liar?, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. 913 (1991). 
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A witness will not falsely claim that an anti-Tutsi rally took place in a cer-
tain stadium, for instance, if she knows that a cursory investigation into the 
stadium's records will show that no rally occurred. Investigations can rarely 
perform either of these functions at the international criminal tribunals, how-
ever. Investigations are costly and difficult to conduct in the regions in 
question and are frequently unproductive even when they are conducted. 
Because so much daily life is carried out without written documentation, in-
vestigations rarely locate evidence that will conclusively prove a given fact. 
In most instances, the best that international investigators can hope to find 
are witnesses who will contradict the accounts given by the witnesses for the 
opposing side. 
These arguments, which are presented here in very summary form, are 
fleshed out and supported in the book. To further summarize, however, I ar-
gue that current international criminal proceedings are conducted in a way 
that creates the illusion that they are routinely capable of reaching justifiable 
factual conclusions on the basis of evidence presented to them, when in fact, 
they are not. 
B. The Trial Chambers' Treatment of Testimonial Deficiencies 
I have contended that the testimonial deficiencies detailed above render 
international criminal fact-finding a far more uncertain endeavor than it out-
wardly appears. Here, I will consider how that conclusion impacts the accu-
racy of Tribunal judgments. 
Prosecutors at the ICTR, SCSL and Special Panels charge defendants 
with performing specific acts in specific places during specific times. As-
sessing these allegations proves a considerable challenge given the vague, 
inconsistent and conflicting testimony that comprises so many international 
criminal proceedings. Indeed, if the Trial Chambers were asked to deter-
mine whether Emmanuel Ndindabahizi participated in attacks against Tutsi 
on Gitwa Hill, for instance, we might expect them to answer incorrectly a 
substantial portion of the time since the fact-finding impediments described 
above make it so difficult to reach accurate determinations of specific 
events. The Trial Chambers are not, however, asked to determine whether 
Ndindabahizi participated in the Gitwa Hill attacks. That question would 
place a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard on the prosecution. The 
Trial Chambers are rather asked to determine whether the prosecution has 
proven its factual allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. That is a very dif-
ferent and potentially much easier question to answer, for while the testi-
monial deficiencies that pervade international criminal proceedings may 
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make it virtually impossible to determine who did do what to whom in an 
international case, that does not mean that it is difficult to determine whether 
or not the prosecution has proven its allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. 
That is, while we may expect that Trial Chambers would regularly reach er-
roneous conclusions if asked to decide cases on a preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard, a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard stacks the deck in 
favor of the defendant and makes it much easier for Trial Chambers to an-
swer correctly the legal question they have been asked. 
Whether the Trial Chambers usually do reach the "correct" legal con-
clusions is not a question that I can answer. But what I can assess is whether 
the Trial Chambers' treatment of fact-finding deficiencies appears consistent 
with the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof that ostensibly go-
verns international criminal fact-finding. As I discuss in more detail in the 
book, some Trial Chambers fail even to mention serious testimonial defi-
ciencies in their judgments, and while most Trial Chambers do acknowledge 
various problems, at least in a general way, they often unquestioningly 
attribute those problems to innocent causes that do not impact the witness's 
credibility. Those attributions may be appropriate in many cases, but they 
also may not be, and even when testimonial deficiencies do have innocent 
causes, they nonetheless can seriously impair the defendant's ability to 
present his defense. Chapter Seven describes the Trial Chambers' treatment 
of fact-finding deficiencies in some detail, so I will confine myself here to 
reporting that, as a general matter, the Trial Chambers adopt a cavalier atti-
tude toward testimonial deficiencies. They invoke educational or experien-
tial deficiencies to explain the failure of many witnesses to provide relevant 
details or to answer whole ranges of questions, and because the Trial Cham-
bers apparently consider it unfair to hold such deficiencies against the wit-
nesses, they overlook the potential impact of vague and undetailed testimony 
on the defendant's ability to present a defense. When it comes to inconsis-
tencies between witnesses' testimony and their previous statements, the Trial 
Chambers explain these away as products of the passage of time, the frailty 
of memory, and errors introduced by investigators and interpreters. The Tri-
al Chambers thus give the prosecution witnesses the benefit of the doubt, 
and they explain away problematic features of their testimony on the basis of 
innocent factors that are beyond the witnesses' control. In sum, Trial Cham-
bers are often content to base their convictions on deeply flawed testimony. 
Given the vague, inconsistent testimony that is the standard fare at the 
international tribunals, the high incidence of perjury, and the difficulty in ve-
rifying even the most basic facts at issue in a case, one might have thought 
that Trial Chambers would rarely be able to conclude that the prosecution 
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had proven its allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. That is, we might 
have expected that the prevalence and severity of the testimonial deficiencies 
would lead Trial Chambers to acquit a substantial proportion of defendants. 
In fact, quite the opposite is true: the international tribunals convict virtually 
every defendant who comes before them of at least one of the crimes for 
which they are charged. 
The SCSL is running a one-hundred percent conviction rate at present, 
having convicted all eight of the defendants who have thus far come before 
the Court. The Special Panels is not far behind with a ninety-seven percent 
conviction rate. The Special Panels acquitted a paltry three defendants out 
of the eighty-seven that it tried, 55 and even those figures understate the true 
acquittal rate because in two of the three acquittals, prosecutors themselves 
recognized that there was insufficient evidence on which to base a convic-
tion and sought to withdraw their indictments. Thus, only one out of eighty-
seven defendants was acquitted after a contested trial. The ICTR's convic-
tion rate - at eighty-five percent - is considerably lower than the other two 
tribunals, and its six acquittals in fact help us to reconceptualize Tribunal 
fact-finding, a topic I mention below and thoroughly detail in Chapter Eight 
of the book. 
Suffice it to say here that the Trial Chambers' lackadaisical attitude to-
ward testimonial deficiencies appears to reflect a pro-conviction bias. Now, 
let me be clear that when I maintain that the Tribunals' fact-finding embo-
dies a pro-conviction bias, I am not suggesting that the Trial Chambers are 
convicting innocent defendants. Far from it, as I will discuss below. What I 
am suggesting, however, is that the Trial Chambers' cavalier attitude toward 
fact-finding impediments is inconsistent with the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard of proof. As I have noted, many cases of problematic testimony 
feature uncertain causes. Circuitous answers could reflect culturally influ-
enced patterns of speech or efforts to evade. Inconsistencies between testi-
mony and a pre-trial statement could signify an investigator's errors or a 
witness's desire to frame the defendant. Because there do exist persuasive 
reasons in most instances for overlooking discrepancies and explaining them 
and other problematic features of witness testimony on the basis of "inno-
cent" explanations, the Trial Chambers' inclination to do so would be un-
problematic if they were deciding cases on a preponderance of the evidence 
standard; that is, if they had only to decide which account of events-the 
prosecution's or the defense's-was more likely than not to be the accurate 
55 The Secretary-General, End of Mandate Report of the Secretary-General on the United Na-
tions Mission of Support in East Timor, fl 20, delivered to the Security Council, UN. Doc. 
S/2005/31 0 (May 12, 2005). 
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one. The Trial Chambers are not so charged, however. They are required to 
acquit the defendant unless the prosecution has proven its facts beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The question, then, is not whether a particular testimonial 
deficiency can be plausibly explained away-most of them can. The ques-
tion is rather whether the existence of that deficiency in testimony that is 
sharply contested by defense witnesses and cannot be objectively verified by 
documentary or forensic evidence should be considered to give rise to a rea-
sonable doubt. Considered in isolation, I believe that the answer to that 
question in most cases is yes. The Trial Chambers do not consider the ques-
tion in isolation, as I explain below, and that fact goes some ways towards 
explaining why the Trial Chambers so rarely reach that answer. 
C. Reconceptualizing International Criminal Fact-Finding 
A final question that I will address here is why the Trial Chambers treat 
testimonial deficiencies so cavalierly. Are the judges conviction-happy? 
Certainly some judges may not possess the most steadfast commitment to 
due process standards, and other judges may be unconsciously influenced by 
the fact that acquittals do not play well either with the international commu-
nity that funds the Tribunals or with the victims of international crimes. But 
the most compelling explanation for the Trial Chambers' willingness to 
overlook testimonial deficiencies lies in notions of organizational liability 
that derive from the Nuremberg Charter. Article 9 of the Nuremberg Charter 
authorized the Nuremberg Tribunal to declare an organization of which a de-
fendant was a member to be a criminal organization. Once the organization 
was declared criminal, then its members could be convicted in subsequent 
trials solely on the basis of their membership in the organization. Under Ar-
ticle 9, then, the prosecution could convict large numbers of Nazis in sum-
mary proceedings. The Nuremberg Tribunal ended up gutting the plan by 
holding that the prosecution had to prove not only that the defendant was a 
member of the criminal organization but that he had voluntarily joined the 
organization and knew of its criminal purposes. The imposition of these 
proof requirements substantially diminished the logistical advantages that 
Article 9 was intended to deliver, so it was not surprising that the charge of 
membership in a criminal organization played a relatively minor role in the 
subsequent trials of Nazis held pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10. A 
meager eighty-seven defendants were charged and tried on this ground, and 
of the seventy-four who were convicted, only ten were convicted on the 
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membership charge alone. 56 That, then, seemed to put an end to organiza-
tional liability; indeed, no other subsequent tribunal has even considered in-
cluding a provision resembling Article 9. I argue, however, that the thinking 
that underlay organizational liability continues to powerfully influence inter-
national criminal fact-finding and serves to explain the Trial Chamber's ca-
valier treatment of testimonial deficiencies. 
In particular, although international criminal indictments typically 
charge defendants with performing particular acts - distributing weapons at 
a massacre site, for instance, or participating in the massacre itself- these 
acts are difficult to assess. In consequence of that difficulty, I believe that 
the Trial Chambers draw inferences from the defendant's group membership 
or official position and use those inferences to supplement the often proble-
matic witness testimony that ostensibly forms the bases for the Trial Cham-
bers' judgments. Such inferences have long been influential in domestic 
criminal fact-finding. In medieval and early modem times, probabilities 
were drawn from the sex, age, education and status of the defendant. Child-
ren were thought to be much like their parents, so a family's lifestyle might 
be invoked to prove a defendant's dishonesty or scandalous behavior. Men 
were thought more likely to be robbers and women poisoners, while well-
bred men of professional classes were considered more likely to be innocent 
of the charges than men of more modest occupations or slaves. 57 Modem-
day fact-finders are just as likely to draw inferences from various aspects of 
a defendant's life, which is why evidence of a defendant's gang membership, 
for instance, is typically excluded from the jury. 58 
Inferences drawn from official position are apt to be all the more in-
fluential in the context of international crimes for a number of reasons. First 
of all, the fact that the international tribunals face such daunting evidentiary 
challenges raises the value of such indirect evidence as official position. 
56 TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUERNBERG 
WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. I 0, at 93 ( 1949). 
57 BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, "BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE": 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 117 (Univ. of Cal. 
Press 1991); see also Barbara J. Shapiro, "Fact" and the Proof of Fact in Anglo-American 
Law (c. 1500- 1850), in How LAW KNows 25, 29 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2007); THOMAS 
ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH 
CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200-1800, 17 (Univ. ofChi. Press 1985). 
58 People v. Williams, 940 P.2d 710, 738 (Cal. 1997); see also United States v. Butler, 71 
F.3d 243, 251 (7th Cir. 1995); People v. Cardenas, 64 7 P.2d 569, 572-73 (Cal. 1982); People 
v. Perez, 170 Cal. Rptr. 619,622-23 (Ct. App. 1981); People v. Avitia, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 887, 
891-95 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); People v. Luparello, 231 Cal. Rptr. 832, 837-40 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1986); People v. Smith, 565 N.E.2d 900, 907-08 (Ill. 1991). 
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Moreover, given the nature of international crimes, a defendant's official po-
sition truly does provide useful information about the defendant's likely cul-
pability in many cases. International crimes such as those which form the 
subject matter of current international trials involve large-scale violence per-
petrated by large numbers of offenders. These are crimes that are orches-
trated by the state or by state-like entities that carry out their activities 
through more or less well-organized sub-bodies that feature more or less 
well-established lines of authority. Thus, once it has been proven that a par-
ticular group is responsible for the atrocities, then the defendant's official 
position in that group is unquestionably probative of his involvement in the 
atrocities. 
Say, for instance, that the prosecution charges the defendant with order-
ing civilian killings during a particular attack. As former ICTY and ICTR 
lead Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, has observed: "When large-scale crimes 
are carried out systematically by military, police or quasi military organs re-
quiring communication and coordination it is logical to infer that criminal 
activity must have been the result of orders."59 And if the defendant was the 
commander of that attack, it is equally logical to infer that the orders were 
given by the defendant. For that reason, even if the prosecution's direct evi-
dence that the defendant ordered the killings is only meager and problematic 
witness testimony, the fact that the defendant was the commander of an at-
tack that featured the widespread and systematic killing of civilians is a fact 
that can compellingly supplement the meager and problematic witness testi-
mony about the orders the defendant gave. 
That example highlights the way in which a defendant's position might 
be relevant to the specific crimes for which he is charged, but often the rela-
tionship between the official position and the crime derives not so much 
from the specific facts of the crimes or the precise contours of the defen-
dant's official duties, but rather from a more amorphous, common-sense un-
derstanding that the defendant could not have held the position he did with-
out playing some role in the atrocities. Consider Adolf Eichmann who was 
Head of the Gestapo's Office of Jewish Affairs. Merely to recognize his title 
is to presume his involvement in Nazi atrocities against the Jews. The con-
tours and implementation mechanisms of modem-day massacres in Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone and East Timor are less well-known to Western audiences, but 
they too can feature Eichmann analogues. For instance, Foday Sankoh's po-
sition as the leader of the RUF-the Sierra Leonean rebel force that is wide-
59 Carla Del Ponte, Investigation and Prosecution of Large-Scale Crimes at the International 
Level: The Experience of the ICTY, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 539,548 (2006). 
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ly blamed for having amputated the limbs of thousands of civilians-<:reates 
the strong inference of his involvement in international crimes. The leader-
ship of the Rwandan genocide is less clear-cut, but even there, some posi-
tions appear patently pertinent to the defendant's likely culpability. For in-
stance, the lnterahamwe - which was the youth wing of the MRND political 
party - has been widely blamed for zealously implementing the genocide 
throughout Rwanda. As a consequence, the fact that ICTR defendant 
Georges Rutaganda was Vice President of the National Committee of the In-
terahamwe has to be relevant-at least in a gestalt sort of way-to the Trial 
Chamber's assessment of the testimony that placed Rutaganda at various 
massacre sites. 
However persuasive a defendant's official position might be in suggest-
ing that the defendant played some-if an undefined-role in the atrocities, 
those suggestions rarely come to the fore because prosecutors typically 
present direct evidence of the defendant's role in the atrocities. So, although 
Rutaganda's position as Vice President of the National Committee of the In-
terahamwe is in and of itself suggestive of Rutaganda's criminal culpability 
given the Interahamwe 'swell-established role in the Rwandan genocide, the 
prosecution sought to prove that Rutaganda personally distributed weapons, 
hunted down Tutsi, and participated in massacres, and it presented witnesses 
who testified that he had. Consequently, it is these allegations that appear in 
the indictments, these allegations that prosecutors seek to prove by means of 
the problematic witness testimony described and these allegations that un-
derlie the convictions that are the end result of virtually every case. The 
problem, of course, is that it is these allegations that are so difficult to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt for all the reasons heretofore discussed. Of 
course, the Trial Chambers do routinely find them proven beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. But this is where the defendant's official position becomes rele-
vant, for the Trial Chambers find these allegations proved beyond a reasona-
ble doubt, I believe, in large part because the Chambers supplement the very 
muddy evidentiary picture that is presented to them at trial with common-
sense inferences that they draw from the defendant's official position. These 
common-sense inferences, indeed, can be seen as bridging the gap between 
the prosecution's poorly supported factual allegations and the Trial Cham-
bers' convictions. Reliance on such inferences, in fact, helps both to explain 
and to justify factual findings that seem questionable on their face. I discuss 
numerous examples in my manuscript and what I found is that the more a 
defendant's official position seems almost to scream out his liability for 
some crime, the less concerned that the Trial Chambers seem to be about tes-
timonial deficiencies that might undermine the prosecution's account of this 
or that particular act. 
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In sum, because objective or reliable evidence is so hard to come by in 
international proceedings, Trial Chambers rely on official position as a 
proxy, an indicator, if you will, of the defendant's involvement in the atroci-
ties. Prosecutors must still present some evidence to support the specific al-
legations appearing in the indictment, but the stronger the inferences that can 
reasonably be drawn from official position, the more that Trial Chambers are 
willing to attribute problematic features of prosecution witness testimony to 
innocent causes. But just as a defendant's official position can suggest a de-
fendant's involvement in the atrocities and by doing so can lead Trial Cham-
bers to take a cavalier attitude toward testimonial deficiencies, other proxies 
can motivate Trial Chambers to more carefully scrutinize testimonial defi-
ciencies. Indeed, although I have maintained that Trial Chambers are gener-
ally inclined to ignore or explain away testimonial deficiencies, a careful ex-
amination of the ICTR acquittals reveals that that is not always the case. 
Indeed, in a number of these acquittals, the evidence supporting the prosecu-
tion's allegations was similar in quality and quantity to the evidence support-
ing most ICTR convictions. The cases resulted in acquittals rather than con-
victions, however, and the different results stemmed from the different 
treatment given to the deficiencies. 
In particular, in these acquittal cases, the Trial Chambers appeared to 
make far more searching inquiries into testimonial deficiencies than is the 
norm at the ICTR. The Trial Chambers scrutinized identifications more 
carefully, they discredited testimony on the basis of vagueness or inconsis-
tencies of the sort that are routinely overlooked or explained away in other 
cases, and they seemed, as a general matter, to apply the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard with greater rigor. And while one can hypothes-
ize numerous factors that might contribute to this enhanced scrutiny-from 
the temperament of the judges on the panel to the demeanor of witnesses on 
the stand-a careful examination of the cases suggests that the inclination of 
these Trial Chambers to conduct a more searching inquiry into testimonial 
deficiencies was driven primarily by the Chambers' sense that the defendant 
did not generally support the genocide. In Bagilishema, for instance, de-
fense counsel presented the defendant's letters that showed his efforts to 
maintain security in his commune and protect the Tutsi from violence. In 
Mpambara, the defense presented two particularly credible witnesses - a 
British physio-therapist and a Spanish priest - who testified that the defen-
dant was likewise trying to stem the violence that was engulfing his com-
mune. And in Bagambiki, the defendant did take some actions against the 
Tutsi, but his actions suggested his desire to reduce the overall level of vi-
olence, not facilitate or expand it. In Bagilishema, Mpambara and Bagam-
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bild, prosecution witnesses attested to the defendants performing various ge-
nocidal acts, as in other cases, yet instead of overlooking the typical testi-
monial deficiencies that pervade witness testimony, the Trial Chambers care-
fully scrutinized those deficiencies and invoked them to justify their 
rejection of the witnesses' testimony. 
In sum, just as the Trial Chambers' general sense that the defendant was 
involved in the genocide in some way-that he was one of the bad guys, as it 
were-inclines it to accept problematic inculpatory testimony about the spe-
cific acts that are attributable to the defendant in the indictment, the Trial 
Chamber's general sense that the defendant did not support the genocide-
that he was one of the good guys, as it were-inclines it to reject problematic 
inculpatory testimony about those same sorts of acts. And because any giv-
en testimonial deficiency can be plausibly explained on the basis of innocent 
or not-innocent grounds, the Trial Chamber may choose from an array of ra-
tionales to justify its factual determinations. 
My analysis suggests that while the Trial Chambers may be adrift with 
respect to assessing the specific allegations that appear in the indictments -
the claim that the defendant called for the extermination of the Tutsi at a par-
ticular rally in Cyangugu, for instance, or the claim that at a particular pass-
ing out ceremony, the defendant instructed his subordinates to kill civilians-
that uncertainty is less worrisome than it appears at first glance because fre-
quently it is not the Trial Chambers' determinations about those specific al-
legations that drives their decision to convict or acquit defendants. The 
prosecution presents witnesses who testify in support of these allegations, 
and the Trial Chambers ostensibly assess this testimony and determine 
whether it is sufficient to prove the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Trial Chamber's fact-finding about these allegations in tum form the 
bases for the Trial Chambers' legal conclusions-their decision whether a 
defendant committed genocide, for instance, or merely conspiracy to commit 
genocide or crimes against humanity. My analysis suggests, however, that 
Tribunal fact-finding is actually broader and less focused on the defendant's 
specific acts. The Trial Chambers are, I believe, engaging in a more com-
prehensive and holistic process that seeks to determine beyond a reasonable 
doubt whether the defendant was involved in the violence in some substan-
tial way. 
D. The Normative Analysis 
The conclusions that I have thus far summarized give rise to a series of 
normative questions that I address in the final two chapters of the book. My 
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analysis of these normative issues is lengthy and complex, and in light of the 
space constraints of this article, I will offer only the briefest of summaries. 
First and foremost, my study requires us to explore improvements that 
might be made to enhance the accuracy of international criminal fact-
finding. Two paths present themselves. The more attractive of the two 
seeks to improve testimonial quality so that it will provide a more solid 
foundation for the judgments that the Trial Chambers will eventually reach. 
To that end, I advocate various adaptations to the pre-trial, trial, and post-
trial processes that currently exist at the international tribunals. I go on, 
moreover, to explore more radical reforms; in particular, I consider whether 
international trial procedures should be fundamentally reformulated, as a 
means of improving testimonial quality. The second, less desirable, path to 
improving fact-finding accuracy focuses not on improving the quality of the 
testimony offered in support of the Trial Chamber's judgments but rather on 
adapting the charges that the prosecution brings so that they better fit the 
(problematic) evidence that the Trial Chambers will receive. The second 
approach, then, assumes sub-optimal testimony and considers how we might 
use certain existing but controversial liability doctrines, such as joint crimi-
nal enterprise, to create a better alignment between the evidence that is re-
ceived and the convictions that are entered. Improving that alignment, I ar-
gue, requires prosecutors to focus less on an individual defendant's 
particular actions and more on the defendant's role in the group criminality 
that characterized the atrocity as a whole. 
Finally, the book's final chapter addresses the broadest and most press-
ing normative question: Will the fact-finding impediments that I have iden-
tified, if they persist, fatally undermine the work of the international tribun-
als? To explore that question, I first consider the adequacy of drawing 
inferences from official position and institutional affiliation. Although these 
proxies can provide useful information in many cases, they do so only when 
prosecutors target the "right" individuals and when the Trial Chambers have 
a sophisticated and nuanced understanding of the way the violence was car-
ried out in the region in question. Assuming that these requirements are not 
always met, I evaluate the fact-finding approach adopted by the SCSL's Ap-
peals Chamber in the AFRC case, since it would reduce the impact of the tes-
timonial deficiencies. Concluding that this approach is also deficient in 
some regards, I consider the most controversial, most problematic means of 
justifying current international criminal fact-finding: a reduction in the stan-
dard of proof. I rely on historical precedents, epistemological arguments, 
and a comparison with domestic prosecutions to conclude that a standard-of-
proof reduction can be defended as a theoretical matter. Nonetheless, I con-
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elude that it should not be undertaken. I go on, however, to consider recent 
legal and empirical scholarship that views the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard as a variable standard that signifies (and that should signify) differ-
ent levels of certainty in different cases. This research not only provides an 
alternative explanation for international criminal fact-finding but also 
enables us to construct a solid justification for it. 
